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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Significant Questions Involving Self-Defense
The application of doctrine and principles of the law of nations is most compellingly tested when international tensions result in the use of force. The body
of public international law governing use of force is at once challenged and
informed by each new instance of violence. During the last fifteen years
several incidents which involved or could have involved the use of force have
raised significant questions concerning the principles of international law
governing the right of states to act in self-defense.
t Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law; W.B. Cutting Fellow 1980-81,
J.S.D. 1987, Columbia University. This paper is part of a larger study in progress on self-defense
and fundamental questions of international law.
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As the catalog of incidents grows, the work of international lawyers to draw
conclusions about the nature and legitimacy of the use of force has struggled

to keep pace. Of particular importance is the invocation of self-defense as a
legitimizing factor in the use of force. The variety of situations in which selfdefense has been raised as a justification calls for a taxonomical reexamination
of self-defense claims in order to distinguish the various shades of meaning

inherent in that phrase.
For example, one important self-defense question centers on the temporal

proximity of the retaliatory use of force to the original attack.

Both the

Falkland-Malvinas Islands conflict between Argentina and Great Britain in the

early spring of 19821 and Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June of that same
year 2 raised the question whether force used some time after an unlawful armed
3
attack can be considered legitimate self-defense.
Yet another question centers on the consequence of a use of force of an en-

tirely different character than that used in the original action. In December
1979, National Security Affairs Advisor Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, intimated that
the United States refused to rule out the possibility of using military force to
counter efforts to block access to essential Persian Gulf resources. 4 This suggestion, made in the wake of the Arab oil embargo, Khomeni's rise to power

in Iran, and Soviet activity in Afghanistan, raised a new question-whether self1. On the conflict generally, see Acevedo, The U.S. Measures Against Argentina Resultingfrom
the Malvinas Conflict, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 323 (1984); Franck, Dulce et Decorum est: The Strategic
Role of Legal Principles in the Falklands War, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 109 (1983); Moore, The InterAmerican System Snarls in Falklands War, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 830 (1982). On the Argentine claim
to use force, see Schachter, The Right of States to Use'Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620, 1636
(1984). On justifying a claim of self-defense, see Hassan, The Sovereignty Dispute Over the
Falkland Islands, 23 VA. J. INr'L L. 53, 64-65 (1982).
2.
S. MALLISON & W. MALLISON, ARMED CoNFLIar IN LEBANON, 1982: HUMANITARIAN LAW
IN A REAL WORLD SETrING (1983); ISRAEL IN LEBANON, REPORT OF THE INT'L COMM'N TO INQUIRE
INTO REPORTED VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY ISRAEL DURING ITS INVASION OF LEBANON

(1983). See generally, W. Mallison, Aggression or Self-Defense in Lebanon in 1982, 77 PROc. AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. 174 (1983); Oliver, Remarks, id. at 168. On Israel's claim of self-defense, see
Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2375th Security Council Meeting, S/PV. 2375 at 17 (1982)
[hereinafter 2375th Security Council Meeting] (statement of Ambassador Yehuda Blum).
3. In the Falkland-Malvinas conflict, Argentina claimed a right to use force to recover the
islands which, Argentina contended, Great Britain had unlawfully taken through the use of force in
1833. See Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2350th Security Meeting, S/PV. 2350 (1982)
[hereinafter 2350th Security Council Meeting] (statement of Ambassador Costa Mendez), reported
in R. PERL, THE FALLANDJ ISLANDS DISPT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITcs 432, 433-43
(1983); 1982 U.N.Y.B. 1320-22 (1982). Prior to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon on June 6, 1982,
Lebanon had attacked Israei on May 9, 1982. See Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, para. 50, U.N. Doc. S/15194 (1982). Israel also referenced the
attack on the Israeli Ambassador to Great Britain in London on June 3, 1982, 2375th Security Council Meeting, supra note 2, at 28-30. But as Robbie Sabel, Counsellor of the Israeli Embassy to the
United States said, the invasion may have been an act of self-defense "in ... response to 17 years
of PLO terror." Sabel, Remarks; Problems of the Law of Armed Conflict in Lebanon, 77 PROc. AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. 240 (1983).
4. Oster, Brzezinski Poses Prospect of Using Preemptive Force, Wash. Post, Dec. 20, 1979,
at A22, col. 3.
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defense may serve as a justification for armed action against economic coer5
cion.
Other incidents implicate anticipatory self-defense, that is, the right to use
defensive force in advance of an armed attack. The gravamen of these incidents is not their contribution to resolving the long-standing debate over the

permissibility of preemptive action generally, 6 but, rather, their introduction of
even more troublesome issues.

The June 1981 Israeli aerial attack on the Tamuz I nuclear reactor in Baghdad, Iraq, 7 for instance, raised the question of whether anticipatory action can

be lawful when it is taken against a threat of attack that will not materialize
until the future. 8 The problem of the "window of vulnerability" resulting from
the strategic missile asymmetry between the United States and the Soviet Union
throughout the latter years of the Cold War,9 the rise to power of the Sandanistas in Nicaragua in 1979,10 and the "neutron bomb" controversy of the late
5. On military force against economic coercion generally, see Farer, Politicaland Economic
Coercion in ContemporaryInternationalLaw, 79 AM. L INT'L L. 405 (1985); Moore, Foreign Policy
Dimensions of the Crisis in Oil, 17 WILLAm=r L. REV. 111, 138 (1980) (force used in response
to a dispute involving oil supplies being cut off); Zedalis, Some Thoughts on the United Nations
Charter and the Use of Military Force Against Economic Coercion, 17 TULSA L.J. 487 (1982).
6. Several commentators take the view that preemptive action is impermissible. I. BROWNLiE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 275-79 (1963); L. HENKIN, How NATIONS
BEHAVE 141-44 (2d ed. 1979); P. JEssUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 166-67 (3d ed. 1968); H.
KEI.SEN, THE LAW OF TE UNtrED NATIONS 797-98 (1950); Kunz, Individual and Collective SelfDefense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 872, 878 (1947);
Tucker, The Interpretationof War Under PresentInternationalLaw, 4 INT'L L.Q. 11, 29-30 (1951).
Commentators who argue in favor of preemptive action include D. BowETr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 188-89 (1958); M. McDouOAL & F. FEUCIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 232-41 (1961); Fawcett, Intervention in InternationalLaw: A Study of Some Recent Cases,
103 RECUEIL DES CouRS 341, 360-63, 365-69 (1961); Fitzmaurice, The General PrinciplesofInternational Law Consideredfrom the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, 92 REcUarL DES CoURS 1, 171-74
(1957); Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in InternationalLaw, 81
RECuEIL DES COuRS 451, 497-98 (1952). An assessment of the law and policy surrounding both
positions is set forth in Zedalis, On the Lawfulness of Forceful Remedies for Violations of Arms
ControlAgreements: "Star Wars" and Other Glimpses at the Future, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
73, 97-116 (1985).
7. See generally D'Amato, Israel'sAir Strike Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 77 AM. J. INT'L
L. 584 (1983); Mallison & Mallison, The Israeli Aerial Attack on June 7, 1981 Upon the Iraqi
Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or Self-Defense?, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 417 (1982); Note, National Self-Defense in InternationalLaw: An Emerging Standardfor a Nuclear Age, 59.N.Y.U. L.
REV. 187 (1984); Note, The Sun Sets on Tamuz I: The Israeli Raid on Iraq's Nuclear Reactor, 13
CAL. W. INT'L L.. 86 (1983).
8. See Zedalis, PreliminaryThoughts on Some Unresolved Questions Involving the Law of Anticipatory Self-Defense, 19 CASE W. RES. L INT'L L. 129 (1987).
9. The seminal work in this area is Nitze, Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Ditente,
54 FOREION AF'. 207 (1976). See also Bissell & Sicherman, Reflections on the Quarter: Judging
SALT 11, 23 ORBIS 251 (1979); Frye, Strategic Build-Down: A ConteXt for Restraint, 62 FoMaON
AF. 293, 295-300 (1983/84).
10. See generally Cruz, Nicaragua'sImperiled Revolution, 61 FOREION AF'. 1031 (1983);
Moore, The Secret War in Central America and the Future of World Order, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 43
(1986); Rowles, "Secret Wars," Self-Defense and the Charter-A Reply to ProfessorMoore, 80 AM.
J. INT'L L. 568 (1986).
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1970s"t each raised the issue of whether an anticipatory self-defense theory may
be used to justify the use of force to preempt threats that disrupt the military
13
equilibrium.1 2 The Reagan administration's "Strategic Defense Initiative"'
presented the related question of whether defensive military systems, as opposed

to offensive systems, are subject to lawful anticipatory action.

4

And finally,

there is the question of whether the availability of countermeasures able to
neutralize an external threat affects the right to take anticipatory action to meet
the threat directly.' 5 This problem was graphically illustrated by the United

States announcement in early 1989 of a contemplated military strike against a
6
Libyan plant suspected of manufacturing chemical weapons.
Separate from the preceding questions, the distinct question of whether selfdefense may be used to justify the use of force to protect nationals abroad has
become very apparent in the context of national efforts to combat international

terrorism. The United States aerial strike on Tripoli and Benghazi, Libya in
April 1986,'17 the dispatch of the United States Army's Delta Force to rescue
II. The problem leading to the debate over the deployment of neutron weapons was the fourto-one tank advantage held by Warsaw Pact forces over NATO forces. See Brennan, The Soviet
Military Build-Up and its Implicationsfor the Negotiations on StrategicArms Limitations, 21 ORBIS
107, 113 (1977); Evans & Novak, The Heated Debate Over The Neutron Bomb, Wash. Post, Mar.
31, 1978, at A19, col. 5. On the question of deployment itself, see Cohen & Van Cleave, In Comment, 21 ORBIS 967 (1978); Shreffler, The Neutron Bomb for NATO Defenses: An Alternative, 21
ORBIS 959 (1978).
12. Professor Farer suggests disequilibrating consequences are not enough to justify a claim of
self-defense since a state must show threat of imminent attack. Farer, Law and War, in 3 THE
FTmE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: CONFLIcr MANAGEMrNT 62-63 (C. Black & R. Falk
eds. 1971). For a contrary view expressed in the context of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, see
McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597, 601-02 (1963).
13. On the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), see Controlling Space Weapons: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and Environment of the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (April 14, 1983); U.S. Congress, Office of
Technology Assessment, Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies (1985); C. GRAY, AMERICAN
MILITARY SPACE POLICY 1-75 (1982); Bethe, Garwin, Gottfried & Kendall, Space-Based BallisticMissile Defense, 251 Sci. AM. 39 (No. 4) (1984); Burrows, Ballistic Missile Defense: The Illusion
of Security, 62 FOREIGN AFt. 843 (1984); Payne & Gray, Nuclear Policy and Defensive Transition,
62 FOREIGN AFti. 820 (1984); Thompson, "Directed Energy" Weapons and the Strategic Balance,
23 ORBIS 697 (1970). SDI was originally proposed in D. GRAHm, THE HIGH FRowmER: A NEv
NATIONAL STRATrEGY (1982).
14. This difficulty arises both from article 51's reference to self-defense if an "attack" occurs
and the customary concept of a threat as involving imminent "attack," which has led commentators
to discuss self-defense solely in terms of offensive systems. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, supra note 6, at
142-45; M. McDouGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 6, at 238.40; J. STONE, OF LAW AND NATIONS
9 (1974).
15. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1938) (speaking of a
necessity "leaving no choice of means."). The mandate of article 2(3) of the Charter requires states
to settle disputes through peaceful means. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
16. See generally D'Amato, InternationalLaw in the Public Forum: The New York Times and
the Libyan Chemical Weapons Plant, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 527 (1989).
17. See generally 86 DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1986, at 1-23; TwMa, Apr. 28, 1986, at 16-33;
NEwSWEEK, Apr. 28, 1986, at 18-30; U.S Calls Libya Raid a Success; 'Choice is theirs,' Reagan
says; Moscow Cancels Schultz Talks, N.Y. Times, April 16, 1986, at Al, col 6.
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the hijacked passengers aboard TWA flight 847 in June 1985,18 the invasion of
Grenada in October 1983,19 the ill-fated Tehran hostage rescue attempt in April
1980,20 and the successful Israeli raid on the Entebbe airport in July 197621
present the question in pronounced form. 22 When taken together with all the
other matters alluded to, the complexity of the modem law of self-defense
becomes apparent.
The questions highlighted by the incidents recounted above are important for
the insights they provide about the content and meaning of the doctrinal standards of self-defense. If doctrinal standards are to have any value, they must
be understandable in the context of their real world application. The significance of any effort designed to add to our understanding of the standards
regulating the use of force cannot be underestimated, especially today, when
there appears to be a marked increase in the disposition of states to use force
directly or through surrogates to accomplish their ideological objectives. 23 But
these questions are important for even more valuable reasons. In posing
problems that lie at the periphery of existing legal doctrine, they invite reflection on the relationship between law and other disciplines. The outer boundary
of the conventional conception of law-a conception which has the greatest
relevancy in straightforward cases-rapidly shades into the behavioral, social,
and philosophical sciences. These questions provoke inquiry into the very nature of law, especially the extent to which "legal" standards can be understood
only when the conventional concept of law is unified with the accumulated
knowledge and wisdom gained by those in other fields of study. Oliver Wendell Holmes may have had the relationship between law and other disciplines
in mind more than a century ago when he wrote:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,

18. Gwertzman, U.S. Said to Send Commando Squad, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1985, § 1, at 1,
col. 5 (force was never actually used for rescue attempt).
19. See generally Joyner, The United States Action in Grenada,78 AM. J. INT'L L. 131 (1984);
J. MOORE,LAW AND THE GRENADA MISSION (1984); R. RUBENSTEIN, THE LESSONS ON GRENADA AND
THE ETHICS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION (1984); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE AND U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE,
GRENADA DocuMENTs:

AN OVERVIEW AND SELECTION

(1984).

20. See generally Schachter, Self-Help in InternationalLaw: U.S. Action in the IranianHostage
Crisis, 37 J. INT'L AFF. 231 (1984); Stein, Contempt, Crisis and the Court: The World Court and
the Hostage Rescue Attempt, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 499 (1982); Note, Resort to Force by States to
Protect Nationals: The US. Rescue Mission to Iran and its Legality Under InternationalLaw, 21
VA. J. INT'L L. 485 (1981).
21. See generally Boyle, InternationalLaw in Time of Crisis: From The Entebbe Raid to the
Hostages Convention, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 769 (1980); Margo, The Legality of the Entebbe Raid in
InternationalLaw: HumanitarianIntervention or BarbaricAggression?, 11 INT'L LAW. 331 (1977);
Note, Use of Forcefor the Protection of Nationals Abroad: The Entebbe Incident, 9 CASE W. REs.
J. INT'L L. 117 (1977).
22. See infra notes 36-51 and accompanying text.
23. The use of terrorism by radical political regimes has increased. See R. CLINE & Y.
ALEXANDER, TERRORISM: THE SOVIET CONNECTION

(1984); S.HOsMER & T.

WOLFE, SovIEr

AND PRACTICE TOWARD THIRD WORLD CONFLICTS (1983); C. STERLING, THm TERROR NETWORK

POUCY

(1981).
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intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the
prejudices which [decisionmakers] share with their fellow-men, have

had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the
rules by which men should be governed. 24

By attempting to understand the relationship between actual experience and
legal doctrine in the context of political aggression, international lawyers may
be able to improve the quality of both. A few examples should illustrate how
an analysis of each of the incidents recounted above would improve the understanding of both simple doctrine and broader legal theory.
Many international scholars agree that the traditional standard for anticipatory

self-defense is reflected in article 51 of the United Nations Charter.25 In 1841,
Secretary of State Webster stated this standard in The Caroline and McLeod

Cases as being a necessity of self-defense "leaving no moment for deliberation. '26 Commentators interpret the standard as requiring a threat of "imminent

attack." 27 The combination of articles 2(3), 2(4), and 51 of the Charter
prohibits the use of force, except in self-defense whenever "an armed attack
occurs," and compels nations to resolve disputes through peaceful means. 28
24.

0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 1 (1881).

25. Article 51 provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 51.

26. Letter from Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox (Apr. 24, 1841), reprinted in 29 BRr. & FOREiGN ST.
PAPERS 1129, 1138 (1857). See generally Jennings, supra note 15.
27. See, e.g., D. BoWErT, supra note 6, at 191-92; W. FRiEDMANN, THE CHANoINo STRUCTURE
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 259 (1964); M. McDouaAL & F. FEaucLANo, supra note 6, at 231; Fawcett,
supra note 6, at 361; J. STONE, LEGAL CoNTROLs OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 244 (1954); Schachter,
supra note 1, at 1634-1635; Schachter, In Defense of InternationalRules on the Use of Force, 53
U. CH. L. REv. 113, 134-36 (1986); Waldock, supra note 6, at 498.
28. Article 2 provides, in full:
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act
in accordance with the following Principles:
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from
membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with
the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner
that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in
accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any State
against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that States which are not Members of the United Nations
act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
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In its attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, Israel could not have made an argument for the presence of an imminent attack. The Tamuz I reactor had not
produced nuclear weapons, and was not even to the point of being able to
produce weapons-grade nuclear fuel. 29 If Webster's statement could be interpreted as stressing the essentiality of a necessity to use force, that is, the
genuine need to resort to an armed response, as opposed to emphasizing temporal proximity as an imperative, the situation might be different. The threat
of an armed attack from Iraq in the future, as opposed to the immediate present,
might then be sufficient to characterize the Israeli bombing as lawful., But it
is only by philosophizing on language, seeking to understand the full meaning
of human expression, that one may begin to unravel the mystery of whether an
interpretation inconsistent with plain language and a century and a half of accepted understanding has any true claim to accuracy. If the search for meaning
were limited to conventional legal reasoning, there would be little doubt of the
outcome: force used without a precipitating threat of imminent attack could
not be justified as self-defense. "Imriainent" would mean what it says, and
both practice and authoritative comment would be marshalled to confirm this.
The Falkland-Malvinas Islands conflict also emphasizes the importance of the
proximity between the armed attack and the response. Argentina's claim of a
right to use military action to recover the islands3 ° directs attention to the meaning of "occurs" and to the relationship between self-defense and the obligation
to settle disputes peacefully. The claim raises a question not answerable
through the use of conventional techniques. At what point does a nation with
a right to resort to force in self-defense lose that right with the passage of time
and become obligated to seek resolution solely through peaceful means? 3' How
soon after one suffers an attack must a response be made in order for it to be
considered defensive? There is nothing inherent in the reference to "occurs"
and the relationship between self-defense and peaceful settlement that delineates
the boundary separating permissible defensive force from impermissible retaliation. Perhaps the way to locate where that demarcation is best situated is by
turning to the social and behavioral sciences. After all, given the decentralized
character of the international legal system, practicality supports rules that mark

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2.
29. Israel's Ambassador, Yehuda Blum, did not dispute this, but suggested in the United Nations

Security Council debates on the attack that the reactor had "less than a month to go before" it
"might have become critical" and thus capable of producing weapons-grade nuclear fuel. 36 U.N.
SCOR (2280th mtg.) at 11, U.N. Doc. S/P.V.2280 (1981).
30. See 2350th Security Council Meeting, supra note 3. See also Hassan, supra note 1, at 6465; Schachter, supra note 1, at 1636.
31. Schachter, supra note I, at 1636, questions "whether the right [of self-defense] remains

available for a substantial period after the attack."
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the limits of legality by reference to empirical evidence of generally expected
community behavior.
The "window of vulnerability" scenario, involving at least a theoretical threat
to United States security by a superior Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal, provides
another excellent example of how study of the incidents previously set forth
can shed light on doctrinal and theoretical considerations. While there is nothing to suggest that the asymmetry in nuclear forces might prompt the United
States to launch a preemptive nuclear strike, the situation focuses attention on
the doctrinal issue of whether armed force is legitimately defensive if used to
redress an imbalance in the military equilibrium when the acting state can
neutralize the threat caused by the imbalance through the use of nonforceful
countermeasures. 32 Since the traditional formulation of the test for anticipatory
self-defense requires not only a necessity for the use of force leaving no moment for deliberation, but also one leaving "no choice of means," 33 the answer
seems obvious. Yet there may be occasions when the threat, or the nation that
creates the imbalance, is so invidious and the potential benefit to society of
using force is so great that it would seem difficult to accept the development
of countermeasures as being the only lawful course. Ethical considerations
could provide an answer to this dilemma; 34 a conventional approach to the traditional doctrine of self-defense seems rather ill-equipped for the task. The result
would always be to deprecate force, regardless of how costly that approach
might be in both economic and human terms. By enlisting ethical concepts,
however, the values that are placed in competition by this dilemma are identified, weighted, and balanced accordingly.
B. Protection of Nationals Abroad: Illustrations and Themes
Thorough study of all of the issues presented by the foregoing would prove
to be an effort of major proportions. This Article will take as its point of departure the more modest task of looking at the discrete category of intervention
to protect nationals abroad, and examine whether this sort of intervention can
be supported doctrinally by the right of self-defense. The Article then turns to
the fundamental question of what is revealed, as a result of the reflection on
doctrine, about the accepted belief that consent is the basis of legal obligation.
The right of self-defense has been invoked in several recent cases involving
the use of force to protect nationals abroad. But if one accepts that article 51
means what it says, that "a Member of the United Nations" has the right to
take defensive action whenever attacked by armed force-if the words are
32. See supra note 12.
33. See supra note 26.
34. The connection between law and language must be made before ethical principles are consuited. This is the same connection found in the instance of temporal proximity, supra notes 1-3,
and it must also be made here because the customary standard's reference to "no choice of means"
suggests that whenever a choice exists, force cannot be used.
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"plain" or the original intent of the dr fters can be discerned in some way-how
can attacks on nationals that do not involve violations of the territorial integrity

of a United Nations member claiming defensive action suffice to trigger that
right?35 Is the distinction between a state and its nationals now to be ignored?

Additionally, since the terms of the Charter represent rights and obligations
forged through the consent of the community of nations, how is it possible to

explain the incorporation of a right to protect nationals without going beyond
the discernible limits imposed by established consensual arrangements?
The apparent ambiguity of doctrinal standards raises an even more fundamen-

tal question: Is there anything about rules of law that are arrived at consensually that makes them binding? Those subject to such rules may follow them

in practice, and those charged with applying them may do so regularly. But
what is there about such law that obligates those subject to it to give it effect?

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and the right to protect one's nationals
abroad provide a frame of reference within which to explore this issue in the

context of international law. The reason the issue is so often shunned, however,
probably has to do with the lack of willingness to expose the fundamental notions on which the modem legal world rests to a reassessment which might
produce surprises.
The most dramatic recent incident concerning article 51 of the Charter in
which the use of force was justified by the need to protect nationals abroad

35. For situations presenting questions about the meaning of the language of article 51 in a
stark way, see supra text accompanying notes 25-31. Throughout this study, it is assumed that the
reference of article 51 to "against a Member of the United Nations" is clear, and attention is instead
focused on whether the consensual nature of article 51 creates an obligation to act as the article
directs. In reality questions concerning the meaning of article 51 are not confined to the situations
discussed above, but also include instances involving the protection of nationals abroad. The words
"against a Member of the United Nations" are not as clear as one might assume. In every case in
which the question involves giving effect to some established standard that reflects a consensual
arrangement, something must be said not only about the matter of whether words mean what they
say, but also about whether things that have traditionally been viewed as part of consent really signify consent, and whether those who consented intended to bind themselves forever to what they
understood the words to mean.
For some tentative conclusions on the meaning of words, see Zedalis, supra note 8, at 134-44.
On the very reality of consent itself, see, for example, R. DwoRIaN, A MAxrEr OF PRINciPIE 278
(1985) (discussing the reality of consent in the context of "hard cases" in which principles are susceptible to judicial interpretation); P. SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW 116 (1984) (on the same theme);
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 209-17, (1980)
(discussing the difficulties of divining intent even in easy cases where the language seems perfectly
clear); Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 4, 9 (1987)
(consent is questionable if it is given simply because the alternative is more objectionable than consenting). For a discussion of the distinction between discovering what the drafters of a particular
standard intended the standard to mean, and discerning whether the drafters of that standard intended
their understood meaning to bind all of those individuals subsequently called upon to apply the standard, see J. Grodin, Do Judges Make Law?, CAI. LAW. 61, 69 (May 1989). In light of these discussions, it should come as no surprise that the task of inquiring into whether law binds is somewhat
narrow and confined.
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was the April 14, 1986 United States aerial strike on Tripoli and Benghazi,
Libya.36 On that date thirteen F-111 attack aircraft 37 and twelve Navy A-6
aircraft38 attacked the International Airport and the Bab al Azizia barracks in

Tripoli, as well as the Sidi Bilal naval commando school and the Benina Airfield in Benghazi. 39 The aerial strike, officially justified by reference to selfdefense under article 51,40 reportedly killed thirty-seven and injured

ninety-three. The strike was apparently precipitated by evidence that linked
Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Kaddafi to the April 5, 1986 bombing of a
West Berlin disco that killed United States Army Sergeant Kenneth Ford4' and
injured seventy-nine other Americans. The evidence further indicated that Kaddafi was planning to carry out future terrorist attacks against more than thirty
42
additional American targets overseas.

Self-defense to protect nationals was also cited as one of the justifications
for the use of force by the United States in its October 25, 1983 invasion of
the Caribbean island of Grenada. 43 In that incident, some 1000 Americans,
36. See 86 DEP-r ST. BuLL, supra note 17, at 1-23.
37. Once over the Atlantic Ocean, the F-Ill strike force, originally twenty-four in number, was
joined by five EF-11 Is (electronic jamming planes) from the Royal Air Force Base at Upper
Heyford, England, and twenty-eight tankers from the Royal Air Force Bases at Mildenhall and Fairford, England. TmE, supra note 17, at 29. After the first refueling over the Bay of Biscay, six
F-ills and one EF-111 returned to their home base. NEwswaEE, supra note 17, at 27. The number
of F-Ills was further reduced when five of the remaining eighteen planes developed malfunctions
in targeting equipment. TwE, supra note 17, at 30.
38. Originally, fourteen A-6 aircraft were launched from the two United States carriers.
NEWSWEEK, supra note 17, at 31. The number of A-6s was reduced to twelve when malfunctions
resulted in two of them aborting their missions and returning to their ship. Id.
39. These targets were selected because of their association with terrorist activity. The military
section of Tripoli International Airport served as a base for Soviet-made planes used to supply and
transport terrorists. Bab al Azizia served as a residence and command center for Libyan leader
Muammar Kaddafi. The Sidi Bilal Naval Commando School served as a training center for international terrorists. Tmm, supra note 17, at 29. The attack on the Benina Airfield is thought to
have destroyed four MIG-23s, two MI-8 lightweight helicopters, and two F-27 propeller driven
aircraft. Id. at 31. At the Tripoli International Airport, five Soviet-made 11-76 transports and
several buildings were destroyed. Id.
40. President Reagan stated, "Self-defense is not only our right, it is our duty. It is the purpose
behind the mission undertaken tonight-a mission fully consistent with Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter." Address to the Nation, 22 WEEKLY CoMP. PRas. Doc. 491, 492 (Apr. 16, 1986). Ambassador Vernon A. Walters, United States permanent representative to the United Nations, reiterated
the claim of self-defense to the United Nations Security Council. See DErT ST. BULL., supra note
17, at 18, 19-21.
41. A second American injured in the bombing, United States Army Staff Sergeant James E.
Goins, died in early June of 1986. Victim of Berlin Blast Dies, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1986, § 1, at
16, col. 1.
42. Ambassador Walters claimed that there was "direct, precise, and irrefutable evidence" that
Libya bore responsibility for the LaBelle disco bombing in West Berlin on April 5, 1986. 86 DEP7r
ST. BULL, supra note 17, at 19. Walters stated that orders to carry out the terrorist attack against
Americans were sent to the Libyan Peoples' Bureau in East Berlin. Id.
43. J. MooRE, supra note 19, at 156 ("lawful humanitarian protection ... in conformity with
Articles 2(4) and 51"). Moore acknowledges the dispute among commentators as to whether protec-
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including approximately 650 students at St. George's University School of
Medicine, were said to be imperiled by the political upheaval and breakdown
of domestic authority surrounding the arrest and murder of Marxist Prime Minister Maurice Bishop by fanatical elements under the leadership of General Hudson Austin. The military action was led by 1900 United States Marines and
Army Airborne Rangers operating with the assistance. of 300 troops from
Jamaica, Barbados, the Dominican Republic, St. Lucia, Antigua, and St. Vincent, all representing the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. 44 Though

the invasion encountered resistance from Grenadian units and so-called Cuban
paramilitary "construction workers," fewer than ninety individuals were killed
on all sides, 45 and those Americans wishing to return to the United States were

allowed to do so without further incident.
The Tehran hostage rescue attempt on April 24, 1980, launched only after
repeated efforts through various channels had failed to secure the release of the

Americans taken six months earlier, evoked an official claim of self-defense
under article 51 as a justification for the use of force to protect nationals
abroad.4 6 Eight helicopters stationed aboard the carrier Nimitz in the Indian

Ocean and six cargo planes carrying ninety commandos were originally
scheduled to rendezvous in the Dasht-Kavir Desert, 200 miles southeast of Teh-

ran.

Only six of the helicopters reached the site, with another helicopter

developing serious hydraulic difficulties shortly thereafter. Without further

ion of nationals "should be viewed as simply not violating Article 2(4) or as permitted defense
under Article 51." Id. at 154.
It is not clear whether self-defense was officially invoked by the United States government in the
Grenada action. On November 2, 1983, before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Deputy
Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam stated one of the justifications as "action to secure and evacuate
endangered U.S. citizens ... undertaken in accordance with well-established principles of international law regarding the protection of one's nationals." Leich, Contemporary Practiceto the United
States Relating to InternationalLaw, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 200, 203 (1984).
Since the official United States government position both before and after the Grenada invasion
characterized the protection of nationals as an action in self-defense, perhaps this position was the
gist of the "principles" to which Deputy Secretary Dam referred.
44. See Hoagland, US. Invades Grenada,Fights Cubans;Reagan Cites Protection of Americans,
Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1983, at Al, col 5; Banta, Spice Island Power Play, TuAF, Oct. 31, 1983, at
78; Army in Grenada Takes Over Power, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1983, at Al, col. 1; Thomas, From
a GrenadianDiplomat: How Party Wrangle Led to Premier'sDeath, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1983, at
§20, col. 1; Cannon, Strategic Airport, Hostage Fears Lead to Move, Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1983, at
Al, col. 2.
45. J. MooRE, supra note 19, at 151.
46. Text of Carter'sMessage to Congress, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1980, at All, col. 1. President
Carter stated: "In carrying out this operation, the United States was acting wholly within its right,
in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to protect and rescue its citizens where
the government of the territory in which they are located is unable or unwilling to protect them."
For the viewpoint of the International Court of Justice on the action, see Concerning United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 43-44; see also Stein, supra
note 20 at 499-504.
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pursuit of the rescue attempt, President Carter ordered the mission aborted. The
only casualties resulting from the incursion were eight American commandos,
who died when one of the remaining five operational helicopters collided with
47
a C-130 transport plane during departure from the rendezvous site.
Arguably the most widely discussed and least challenged of the recent incidents involving protection of nationals abroad was the attack on the Entebbe
Airport by Israeli commandos on July 4, 1976.41 On June 27, 1976 four members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked an Air France
jet en route from Tel Aviv to Paris via Athens, carrying 256 passengers and a
crew of twelve, shortly after departure from Athens. The hijackers ordered the
plane to Libya for refueling and then on to Entebbe, Uganda, where it received
permission to land. Upon arrival, the Ugandan authorities sought to assist the
hijackers in compelling the release of terrorists in custody in Israel and elsewhere. 49 Following the release of 147 non-Israeli passengers, and after it was
evident that Uganda was unwilling to secure freedom for the remaining passengers, Israel decided to attack in order to prevent the terrorists from executing
the hostages. Justification for the attack, which freed 105 Israelis, was rested
squarely on the right of self-defense.50 Fatalities included three hostages, one
Israeli commando, seven terrorists, and between twenty and thirty Ugandan
51
soldiers.
The four episodes recounted above illustrate the conviction and frequency
with which states claim self-defense as a justification for the use of force to
protect nationals abroad. Sifting through all of the factual evidence and assessing the merits of each of the preceding claims is beyond the scope of this
Article.' The emphasis will be on the exploration of doctrine to determine the
accuracy of the argument that protection of nationals can be justified as selfdefense under article 51, and on the exploration of theory to better understand
the nature of legal obligation and thus develop a coherent picture of the contours of the right of self-defense. On the issue of theory, the focus will be
confined to examining the idea that consent is the basis of legal obligation.

47. See Taubman, Months of Plans, Then Failure in the Desert, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1980, at
Al, col. 2.
48. See generally Y. BEN-PORAT, E. HABER & Z. Sctnrr, ENTEBBE RESCUE (1977); H. KYEMBA,
A STATE OF BLOOD (1977); Y. RABIN, THE RABiN MEMOIRS 282-89 (1979); W. STEVENSON, 90
MNUrEs AT ENTEBBE (1976).
49. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1976, at Al, col. 2.
50. Boyle, supra note 21, at 811 ("founding its defense... squarely upon the right of individual
self-defense in international law"). The Legal Advisor of the United States Department of State
apparently took the same position. See Internal Memorandum of July 8, 1976 from Legal Advisor
Monroe Leigh to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, excerpted in 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 122, 123
(1979) ("The right [to protect nationals], like the right of self-defense from which it flows" permits
the use of "necessary and appropriate" force.).
51. See Internal Memorandum of July 8, 1976 from Legal Advisor Monroe Leigh to Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger, excerpted in 73 AM. J. lsrr'L L. 122. One hostage, left behind at a Kam-
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Justifications not grounded in consent that might support intervention to protect
nationals abroad in particular circumstances will not be addressed.
II. "NON SELF-DEFENSE" PROTECTION THEORIES
Self-defense is not the only theory advanced to support the use of force to
protect nationals abroad. Before examining the self-defense theory, it may be
useful to look at the other theories upon which proponents of the right to use
force have relied. Two points bear noting. First, there seems to be no dispute
that traditional international law permitted states to use force to protect nationals
abroad.52 Second, with the adoption of the United Nations Charter most states
understood that this traditional right no longer existed. 53 The first point is important because any claim to use force to protect nationals today is a claim to
a preexisting right; the second point is noteworthy because if self-defense can
justify the use of force to protect nationals, a majority of states have an
erroneous impression of the effect of the Charter on that preexisting right.
A. The Use of Force to Protect Nationals Abroad Does Not Violate
Article 2(4)
One of the "non self-defense" theories put forth to legitimize the use of force
to protect nationals is that force used for such a purpose is not violative of
article 2(4) of the Charter and, thus, is not prohibited. 54 The premise is that
only force contravening article 2(4) is prohibited; actions not falling within the
definitions of that provision need not be justified by reference to article 51 or
any other Charter provision. Since force used to protect nationals abroad is
not, in the terms of article 2(4), "against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state," 55 its use is not prohibited by the Charter, and it needs
no further justification. The purpose of using force is to protect nationals
abroad, not to change territorial boundaries or impair the political sovereignty
of another state.
pala Uganda hospital, was later taken by Ugandan authorities and killed. See H.

note 48, at 166-78.
52. I. BROWNIR, supra note 6, at 289-90.
53. See generally R. HIGoirNs, TIE DEVELOPMENT

KYEMBA,

supra

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLT-

UNr)ED NATIONS 167-222 (1963) (noting that the practice from 1945 to 1960
was restrictive); Fonteyne, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights: Recent Views
from the United Nations, in HUMANrrARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS, 197 app. B, at
216-18 (R. Lllich ed. 1973) [hereinafter HUMANrrARIAN INTERVENIrON] (noting that the practice from
1960 to 1970 continued to be restrictive); Note, supra note 20, at 487.
54. See, e.g., L. HENKIN, supra note 6, at 145 (Israel "could plausibly argue" that the raid on
Entebbe Airport was lawful since it was not violative of article 2(4)); Reisman & McDougal,
HumanitarianIntervention to Protectthe Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNrrED NATIONS, app. A at 167-78 (making the argument with regard to force to protect nationals and nonCAL ORGANS OF THE

nationals).
55. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
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Article 2(4), however, provides for more than just a prohibition on force
against territorial integrity or political independence. It also prohibits, in its
final clause, force "in any other matter inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations. '56 The extent to which force used to protect nationals abroad
is prohibited depends on whether the force used to accomplish such an objective
is inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations as set forth in article
1. Further, one must decide whether the use of force must be inconsistent with
each and every one of those purposes if it is to be prohibited, or whether conflict with any single purpose is enough to deem the action unlawful.
The use of force to protect nationals abroad would be inconsistent with the
United Nations purpose of "maintain[ing] international peace and security"
through "collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace . . . . 57 The unilateral use of force to address a threat to the peace
arising from maltreatment of one's nationals located in another state is not encompassed in article 1, paragraph 1.58 Members of the international community
are to deal with problems of that nature by acting in concert. 59 Unilateral force
to protect nationals is also inconsistent with article 1, paragraph 2, in that it
would hinder, though perhaps only briefly, the development of "friendly relations among nations. '60
On the other hand, the use of force for the benefit of nationals abroad may
not be inconsistent with paragraphs 3 and 4 of article 1. Paragraph 3's command that the United Nations "achieve international cooperation in ...promot' 61
ing and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms,
and the exhortation of paragraph 4 to "be a center for harmonizing the actions
of nations in the attainment of these common ends,' 62 may in fact be furthered
by the use of force. It would not stretch credulity to imagine that in protecting
its nationals threatened with harm or subjected to maltreatment, a state using
force promotes respect for the basic human interest in freedom from abuse.
Furthermore, the use of force by the acting state puts the maltreating state and
other states that may be disposed toward similar conduct on notice of the type
of response such behavior might generate. Such action would serve to encourage respect for human rights through deterrence of the violation of those
rights and help overcome the difficulty facing United Nations efforts to har-

56. Id.
57. Id. art. 1, para. 1.
58. See R. HICINS, supra note 53, at 220 (maltreatment of nationals constitutes a threat to
peace).
59. See D. BowErr, supra note 6, at 154 (stating that article 1(1) has the effect of limiting the
use of force, except in self-defense, to instances where the use or threat of force is a matter of
collective action).
60. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
61. Id. art. 1, para. 3.
62. Id. art. 1, para. 4.
63. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
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monize nations in attaining the common end of the observance of human rights
and the preservation of fundamental freedoms.
The use of force by a state to protect its nationals is inconsistent with paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 1 of the Charter, but not necessarily inconsistent with
paragraphs 3 and 4. This incongruity reveals the importance of the textual
question raised above: Must such force be inconsistent with each and every
purpose stated in article 1 in order to be prohibited by the final clause of article
2(4)? The use of "the Purposes," 63 rather than "a Purpose," in article 2(4) suggests that only force inconsistent with all the purposes enumerated in article 1
is prohibited. 64 Force that is not inconsistent with at least one of the several
purposes stated in that article lies beyond the ambit of article 2(4)'s prohibition.
There is some evidence that makes it somewhat difficult to accept such a
literal reading of article 2(4)'s final clause. During the San Francisco Conference on International Organization in 1945, the delegate from Brazil indicated that the referenced clause could restrict the interpretation of article 2(4).65
Since the opening language of 2(4) prohibited threats or uses of force, the final
clause could be viewed as limiting that prohibition to apply only to threats or
uses of force inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. In response
to that suggestion, the United States delegate observed that "the phrase 'or in
any other manner' was designed to ensure that there should be no loopholes"
in article 2(4)'s prohibition. 66 Significantly, this observation went unchallenged, indicating possible recognition that article 2(4) applied to the use of
any force inconsistent with the terms of article 1, even though such force was
not inconsistent with each and every one of the purposes stated in that article.
The major weakness in this argument is that the thrust of the "no loopholes"
observation may have been to note that article 2(4)'s prohibition went beyond
the threat or use of armed force against a state's territorial integrity or political
independence to include any other kind of force that might prove inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations. The United States delegate emphasized the "or in any other manner" phraseology 67 and followed not only the
Brazilian delegate's remark about the possible limiting effect of article 2(4)'s
final clause, but also followed another remark by the Brazilian delegate suggesting the inclusion of a specific reference to the prohibition of economic coercion in article 2(4).6s This discussion supports, but does not resolve, the
64. But cf. article 1 of the Consensus Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 31) at 143, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) (aggression is the use of armed force "against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charterof the United Nations"). This suggests that an action inconsistent with
any single portion of the Charter would be considered aggression.
65. Doc. 784, 1/1/27, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. at 334-335 (1945).
66. Id.
67. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
68. See-Doc. 784, 1/1/27, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 334 (1945). One might ask what this says about
the effect of article 2(4) in regulating economic coercion. The "no loopholes" observation might
suggest that the United States felt that the language of article 2(4) was sufficiently broad to encompass such regulation, particularly since, as already noted, the word "force" is not qualified. Con-
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relevancy of the "no loopholes" observation in deciphering the meaning of "the
Purposes" language in article 2(4).
There is additional evidence that is more persuasive in challenging a literal
reading of article 2(4)'s final clause. During the San Francisco Conference,
the original draft of article 2(4) appeared in Chapter II, paragraph 4, of the
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. 69 The language of that provision was virtually
identical to article 2(4) of the Charter as adopted.70 The principal variation
was the absence of the words "against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state," which were included after the adoption of an amendment proposed by Australia. 71 , Norway suggested that the Australian version
of article 2(4) be changed to prohibit "any use of force not approved by the
Security Council. 7 2 Though the Norwegian suggestion was rejected because
of the ambiguity of the specific words "not approved," it was later described
in a report of a subcommittee of the first committee "as clarifying the Australian
amendment, ' 73 with the report to Commission I from the first committee noting
that "in view of the [rejected] Norwegian amendment, the unilateral use of force
or similar coercive measures is not authorized or admitted" by article 2(4).74
The Committee's report then stated that with the exception of self-defense, the
"use of force, therefore, remains legitimate only to back up decisions of the
organization. '75 This approach was adopted without dissent in the report to the
76
Plenary Session of the Conference.
Given this background, it would not seem fair to view the reference to "the
Purposes" to mean that only action inconsistent with every one of the purposes
stated in the opening provision of the Charter falls within the purview of the
prohibition contained in article 2(4). Under such a reading, unilateral uses of
force other than in self-defense would be permissible under the Charter so long
as they were not inconsistent with each of the several purposes stated in article
1. Yet the official records surrounding the adoption of article 2(4) clearly indicate that, with the exception of self-defense, force remained legitimate after
the adoption of the Charter only to suppqrt decisions of the organization. Thus,

versely, it could indicate that the United States felt that the concluding clause of article 2(4) had
no limiting effect on that article's opening language.
69. Proposalsfor the Establishment of a General International Organization, 11 DEPot ST.
BULL 368 (Oct. 8, 1944).

70. "All members of the Organization shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Organization." Id.
71. Doc. 2, G/14(1), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 543 (1945); Doe. 215, I/l/10, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 557

(1945).
72. Doe. 215, I/1/10, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 564 (1945).
73. Doe. 739, I/l/A/19(a), 6 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 720 (1945).
74. Doe. 885, 1/1/34, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 400 (1945).

75. Id.
76. Doe. 1179, 1/9/(1), 6 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 247 (1945).
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"the Purposes" cannot mean that only force inconsistent with every single one
of the purposes falls within the scope of article 2(4) and is therefore prohibited.
The text of article 2(4) itself supplies additional evidence that confirms this
conclusion. The prohibition on force inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations applies to force inconsistent with those purposes "in any other
manner." The term "other" refers to the prohibition on force against a state's
territorial integrity or political independence contained in article 2(4)'s opening
clause. If "the Purposes" were to mean that only uses of force inconsistent
with all of the purposes stated in article 1 fall within article 2(4), then "other"
must mean that force against another state's territorial integrity or political independence is inconsistent with all of article l's purposes. Force against
another state's territorial integrity or political independence, though, may not
always be inconsistent with each and every one of the purposes set forth in
article 1. There could well be instances in which force against a state's territorial integrity and political independence may not be inconsistent with the
purposes of achieving international cooperation in solving economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems, or in helping the United Nations address the
difficulties facing the world community. 77 Nevertheless, force against territorial
integrity or political independence is still prohibited by the plain meaning of
article 2(4).
At least two prominent international legal scholars have argued that the reference to "the Purposes" does not require that force be inconsistent with all of
the purposes of the United Nations in order to be limited by the terms of article
2(4), while still contending that if the use of force is consistent with one or
more of the several purposes, even if simultaneously inconsistent with other
purposes, it may be permissible. 78 Whenever force is used to protect nationals,
the action is inconsistent with "collective" efforts to maintain peace but may
be consistent with the purpose of promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights. When these dual purposes of the United Nations happen to conflict, "it
is distortion to argue that [force] is precluded by article 2(4).''79 Human rights
are a fundamental concern of the Charter which can outweigh the maintenance
of peace. Unilateral action to promote those rights is a substitute for collective
measures to prevent or remove threats to the peace arising from the violation
of those rights. 0

77. The Grenada invasion is one example. See supra note 19. United States action was initially
designed to rescue imperiled United States nationals. One could assert that the invasion promoted
respect for human rights. To the extent, however, that the objective was to oust Marxist elements
and to restore democracy, the invasion constituted prohibited force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of another state.
78. See Reisman & McDougal, supra note 54.

79. Id. at 177.
80. Id. at 168-78.
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An argument to the contrary is that since force need not be inconsistent with
each and every single purpose stated in article 1 in order to fall within the
prohibition of article 2(4), inconsistency with any one of the first article's
several purposes results in force being included in article 2(4)'s prohibition.
This would eliminate the need to balance conflicts between competing purposes
and make for a much clearer decision. The negotiating documents support this
interpretation because no other interpretation of article 2(4) would go as far to
close loopholes and prohibit all uses of force, except in self-defense, not
designed to "back up decisions of the organization." 81
The weakness in this argument is that inconsistency with a purpose stated in
article 1 can result not just from the use of force, but also from the failure to
use force in specific instances. An example would be the lack of respect for
human rights and the consequent fettering of the United Nations efforts to
promote and encourage such rights, resulting from the failure of a nation to
use force to protect its nationals subjected to maltreatment abroad. If inconsistency with any one of the United Nations several purposes is impermissible,
inconsistency resulting from the failure to use force should also be impermissible.
This criticism lacks merit because although the failure to use force may create
an inconsistency with one of the purposes stated in the Charter's opening article, the aim of the Charter is to regulate decisions involving the use of force,
not decisions declining to use force. Article 2(4) calls upon states to refrain
from the "threat" or "use" of force. Although a decision declining to use force
may be inconsistent with article 1, it is not enough to come within the limitations of article 2(4). For the Charter's limitations to apply, the decision that
produces the inconsistency must be one resulting from the use of force. Acknowledging that a failure to use force might be inconsistent with the purposes
of the United Nations does not weaken the argument that article 2(4)'s reference
to "the Purposes" means inconsistency with any one of the United Nations purposes stated in article 1.
Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter indicate that the balancing approach to
resolving conflicts between competing purposes should be rejected in favor of
an approach prohibiting uses of force inconsistent with any one of the United
Nations several purposes. 82 These articles address the matter of human rights
81. See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
82. The relevant Charter provisions provide:
Article 55. With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall

promote:
(a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social
progress and development;
(b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational co-operation; and
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
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and are therefore likely to be implicated when one nation maltreats the nationals
of another country. Article 55 obligates the United Nations to promote the observance of human rights and the respect for fundamental freedoms.13 Article
56 contains a pledge by all members of the Organization to take "joint and
separate action in cooperation with the Organization" to achieve those objectives. 84 The question is whether the pledge contained in article 56 contemplates
military force unilaterally taken by one state to achieve the promotion of human
fights in another state. If so, then the balancing test may be acceptable. If
not, then the balancing test should be rejected in favor of the approach prohibiting use of force inconsistent with any single purpose of the United Nations
85
stated in article 1 of the Charter.
Assuming that article 56's reference to "action" envisions military force, there
are several reasons why the reference to such action being "separate" cannot
encompass the use of unilateral military force by one state to protect nationals
of that state located within the borders of another state. Although article 56
mentions "separate" action, the article also states that such action must be "in
cooperation with the Organization. 8 6 The obvious need for celerity and
secrecy in operations to protect nationals suggests that cooperation is extremely
infeasible. Yet without such cooperation, the conditions of article 56 cannot
be satisfied.
Another reason for not interpreting "separate action" as unilateral military action is derived from the chronology surrounding the adoption of article 56. Article 56 was added as a compromise to the recommendation from a drafting
subcommittee of Committee Three at the 1945 San Francisco Conference
'87
obligating members to "cooperate jointly and severally with the Organization.
The subcomnmittee recommendation emerged after the full committee referred
an Australian proposal, 8 which the subcommittee had adopted earlier,8 9 back
to the subcommittee. The proposal pledged the members of the United Nations

Article 56. All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 55 & 56.
83. U.N. CHARTER art 55.

84. Id. art. 56.
85. Article 56 promotes the interests set forth in article 55. These interests parallel the purposes
of the United Nations, other than the maintenance of peace, which is provided for in article 1 of
the Charter. If unilateral action to advance the interests set out in article 55 is not contemplated
by article 56, then the use of forceful action of a unilateral nature to advance the purposes of the
United Nations set forth in article 1 would also not be contemplated. If so, then a balancing test
to resolve conflicts between the maintenance of peace and other purposes stated in article 1 is meaningless and inapplicable.
86. U.N. CHARTER art 56.
87. Doc. WD-46, 11/3/35, 10 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 394 (1945).
88. See L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DocumrENTs 380-8.1 (3rd rev. ed. 1969).
89. Doc. WD-18, 11/3/A[3, 10 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 382 (1945).
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to take "separate and joint action and cooperate with the Organization and with
each other." 9° If Committee Three had endorsed the Australian proposal and
if the proposal had found its way into the Charter, the text of that proposal
would have provided greater latitude to argue for the unilateral use of military
force, since the reference to "separate action" was not qualified by the phrase
"in cooperation with the Organization." The adoption by the Conference and
subsequent incorporation into the Charter, of a provision which does qualify
"separate action" in this manner suggests that the article should be given its
plain meaning.
Finally, rejecting the idea of unilateral military action involves Australia's
understanding of the significance of not qualifying "separate action" by requiring it to be taken "in cooperation with the Organization." The effort to
decouple these two concepts was not intended to create a basis for unilateral
national intervention in the affairs of another state. 91 During Committee discussions of the recommendation requiring states to "cooperate jointly and
severally with the Organization, '92 Australia offered substitute language
proposing that members pledge themselves "to cooperate with the Organization
and with each other and to take such independent action as they deem appropriate .. .within their own territories.'93 The objective in providing for

action of a separate nature, without the need for cooperation with the United
Nations, was apparently to require each state to employ measures within its
94
own borders to assure adequate protection of fundamental human rights.
Thus, even had the language of the original Australian proposal been incorporated into article 56 of the Charter, unilateral military action in another state
would still not have been authorized.
In light of this background of article 56, it would seem reasonable to conclude
that unilateral national action to enforce human rights in another state is not
contemplated by articles 55 and 56. It is therefore difficult to accept the idea
that conflicts between the maintenance of peace and other purposes of article

90. Id.
91. But see Reisman & McDougal, supra note 54, at 175 (giving a broad interpretation to article
56 in allowing states to act "singly").
92. See supra note 90.
93. Doc. 699, 113/40, 10 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 139 (1945) (emphasis added).
94. See Franck & Rodley, After Bangledesh: The Law of HumanitarianIntervention by Military
Force, 67 AM. J. IN'L L. 275, 299, n.109 and accompanying text. In addition to articles 55 and
56 of the Charter, one might cite the following documents as authority for unilateral intervention:
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR at 12, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948); Inteinational Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). Although these instruments do endorse human rights,
they do not authorize unilateral intervention by one state to enforce such rights in another state.
The Universal Declaration refers to "teaching and education" to promote its goals, while the International Covenant refers to periodic nationally prepared reports and the receipt of complaints by a
Human Rights Committee.
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1 are to be resolved by a balancing test, for there is nothing against which to
balance the purposes set out in article 1 if unilateral action to enforce human
rights is itself beyond the scope of article 56. But might not the disapproval
of unilateral action in article 56 merely indicate that in the estimation of the
drafters, whenever a balancing test is applied to an action to promote human
rights, the scales invariably tip in favor of the maintenance of peace as mentioned in article 1? Given the parallelism between article 55 and paragraphs
2 and 3 of article 1 describing the purposes of the United Nations, the distinction between rejecting the balancing test for a test based on inconsistency with
any one of the purposes of the United Nations, and arguing that the drafters
acknowledged the applicability of a balancing test, but simply fashioned the
Charter such that the maintenance of peace can never be outweighed by other
concerns, seems meaningless. In either case, unilateral military action to enforce human rights in another state would be prohibited.
B. Practical ConsiderationsAffect Assessment of Legitimacy
The preceding discussion has dealt with efforts to justify the use of force to
protect nationals abroad on the grounds that such action does not violate paragraph 4 of article 2 of the Charter. A second theory admits that such action
violates the terms of the Charter's prohibition, but maintains that the legitimacy
of action to protect one's nationals hinges ultimately on practical considerations-namely, all of the conditions that provide the context in which international decisions are generally made and evaluated. This theory attempts to
develop the case for the legitimacy of action to protect nationals abroad based
on two lines of argument, which have been described as the "subsequent
reinterpretation" and the "second-tier criteria" approaches. 95 While recognizing
that maltreatment of nationals abroad can empower the Security Council to use
military force, 96 the subsequent reinterpretation approach holds that the frequent
inability of the United Nations to act swiftly enough, or to act at all, and the
reality that states will take measures to protect nationals abroad, have subjected
the Charter limitation on the unilateral use of force to a revival of the traditional
right to intervene for such purposes. 97 The second-tier criteria approach asserts
that the ultimate consideration in assessing the legitimacy of unilateral use of
force to protect nationals is "reasonableness," and that reasonable objective and
95.

HuMANrrARiAN INTERVENTION, supra note 53, at 61-62 (comment by Lillich).
96. Under article 42, the Council is authorized to use military force. U.N. CHARTEm, art. 42.
That authorization depends on a determination that there exists a "threat to the peace" under article
39. Id. art. 39. While maltreatment by a state of its own nationals may not constitute a "threat to
the peace" and would be outside of the ambit of United Nations power due to the "domestic jurisdiction" limitation of article 2(7), maltreatment by a state of alien nationals residing in that state
could arguably endanger international peace because of the risk of action by the aliens' home state.
97. HUMANrTAaiAN INTERMvENON, supra note 53, at 61 (comment by Lillich); see Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IowA L. REv. 325, 326, 344-45 (1967).
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subjective factors can mitigate or overcome rule-oriented determinations of
illegality. 98
The most obvious problem with the subsequent reinterpretation approach is
that nothing in the Charter indicates that the obligation to refrain from the threat
or use of force in international relations was conditioned upon the United Nations ability to take effective action to assure the preservation of human rights. 99
The preamble of article 2 provides that members "shall act" in accordance with
several principles, one of which declares that members "shall refrain" from
threats or use of force. 100 This obligation upon members to avoid the use or
threat of force is absolute and arose at the instant the Charter became effective.
As we have seen, the obligation does not provide a loophole for unilateral
measures of one state to enforce fundamental human freedoms in another
state,'1 1 and applies notwithstanding the fact that the Charter framework for
Security Council action may be paralyzed by the veto of a permanent mem10 2

ber.

Positions taken by various member states in General Assembly resolutions
following the adoption of the Charter also suggest that the obligation of article
2(4) is not conditioned upon the effectiveness of the United Nations itself, but
rather that, regardless of how the organization functions, the members of the
world community are expected to behave in a certain manner. If nothing else,
these resolutions are valuable as indications of the intent of state members. The
earliest United Nations resolution reflecting this notion is the "Declaration on
the Inadmissibility of Intervention"'13 (Declaration on Nonintervention) of 1965.
After noting that "armed intervention is synonymous with aggression" and is a
"violation of the Charter of the United Nations," the Declaration condemned
intervention in the internal or external affairs of another state "for any reason
whatever."''1 4 Such a broad condemnation seems unlikely if states had perceived the Charter's limitation on the use of force as predicated on the effective
functioning of the organization. Otherwise, the condemnation of force would
have been drafted much more narrowly.
The 1970 "Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States"' 0 5 (Declaration Concerning
98. Cf. Falk, The Beirut Raid and the InternationalLaw of Retaliation, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 415,

437-39 (1969) (taking this approach with respect to reprisals).
99. See Hassan, Realpolitik in InternationalLaw: After Tanzanian-Ugandan Conflict
"HumanitarianIntervention" Reexamined, 17 Wiu.Amr L. REv. 859, 890 (1981).
100. See supra note 28.

101. See supra notes 65-94 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 28.

103. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 14) at 11, U.N. Doe. A/6014 (1965) [hereinafter Declaration on Nonintervention].
104. Id. at 12.
105. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970) [hereinafter Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations].
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Friendly Relations) is only slightly less clear in expressing disapproval of intervention to protect nationals. The introductory statements of the Declaration
Concerning Friendly Relations observe that "any form of intervention" violates
the Charter, while the opening paragraph, which elaborates the third principle
of friendly relations solemnly proclaimed in the Declaration, contains language
virtually identical to that of article 1 of the Declaration on Nonintervention." °6
The Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations goes further than the Nonintervention Declaration by holding that intervention is not simply condemned, but
actually violative of international law,10 7 and by extending the idea of who can
be involved in violative activity beyond individual states to groups of states.10 8
The language of elaboration contained in the Declaration Concerning Friendly
Relations is attached to principle number three, which imposes a duty not to
intervene in "matters within the domestic jurisdiction"'' °9 of another state. This
might indicate a paring down of the obligation of nonintervention first stated
in the 1965 Declaration because that earlier stated obligation, which is just like
that in the 1970 Declaration, was not associated with qualifying language
similar to that in the third principle. Maltreatment of foreign nationals threatens
international peace and creates an international problem, thereby causing the
situation to fall beyond the domestic jurisdiction of the maltreating state.110 The
1970 Declaration could be interpreted as permitting unilateral intervention to
protect nationals abroad because such action falls outside of the "domestic jurisdiction" qualification. The weakness in this conclusion is that maltreatment of
foreign nationals should not result in the sanction of unilateral action prohibited
by article 2(4), 1' but rather trigger the powers of the United Nations to take
'1 2
collective action.
Like the Declaration on Intervention and the Declaration Concerning Friendly
Relations, the "Defimition of Aggression" of 1974113 suggests that the use of
force to protect nationals is impermissible, and that the Charter is not to be
interpreted in light of the effectiveness of the United Nations in addressing international difficulties. After reaffirmning the Declaration Concerning Friendly
Relations and noting that "aggression is the most serious and dangerous form
of the illegal use of force,"' 1 4 article 1 of the 1974 General Assembly resolution
provides a definition of aggression that follows the language of article 2(4) of
106. Compare Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations, supra note 105 with Declaration on
Nonintervention, supra note 103.

107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.

Id.
See supra note 96.
111. See supra notes 54-94 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 96. See also P. Jassup, supra note 6, at 169-70 (modem law envisions
collective action to protect nationals abroad).
113. G.A. ReS. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974)
[hereinafter Definition of Aggression].

114. Id. at 143.
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the Charter, except that it is expressly made applicable only to "armed" force.' 15
If armed intervention to protect nationals is prohibited by article 2(4) of the
Charter as argued above, then it also constitutes aggression under the 1974
Definition, since both documents use virtually identical language.
Article 2 of the Definition refers to Security Council conclusions that armed
force in some situations is not aggression under the "relevant circumstances." ' 6
This provision would not save intervention to protect nationals, though it might
approve force used for-other purposes. The provision is qualified by article 6,
which states that "[n]othing in this Definition shall be construed as in any way
enlarging... the scope of the Charter, including its provisions concerning cases
in which the use of force is lawful.""17 The Charter's limited approval of the
use of force does not now include, nor has it ever included, the protection of
nationals. The Security Council provision cannot enlarge the scope of approved
force under the Charter.
A third problem with accepting the subsequent reinterpretation approach was
first raised in the opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Corfu
Channel case.18 This litigation involved a dispute between the United
Kingdom and Albania in 1949 over passage of British ships through the North
Corfu Strait. In May 1946, Albanian shore batteries fired upon British ships
exercising the right of innocent passage through the Strait. That October, the
British sent four warships through the Strait with guns ready to fire. The Court
did not view the United Kingdom's measure as prejudicing innocent passage." 9
In November 1946, the British dispatched a large force of vessels to the North
Corfu Strait to sweep mines planted by Albania. The British defended this mission as a means of collecting evidence of Albanian illegality and removing an
international nuisance. The Court observed that the operation was a "manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious
abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in international
'20
organization, find a place in international law.'
This case may well be inapposite to the matter of intervention to protect nationals. The Court faced only the question of how to characterize the British
naval activities in November 1946, which were not limited to mere passage
through the North Corfu Strait. Nevertheless, it would seem that the Court's
comments in that context bear on the more general question of whether the
failure of the United Nations to accomplish its purposes warrants the view that
traditional rights are thereby revived. The opinion of the Court recognized the
existence of defects in the Charter system, and deemed them insufficient to permit the assertion of rights of intervention under traditional international law.
115. Id.

116. Id.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. art. 6, at 144.
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4.
Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 35.
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Based on this analysis, the subsequent reinterpretation approach seems
untenable.

Problems also exist with the second-tier criteria approach for justifying the
legitimacy of the protection of nationals through force. First, there is the recurrent problem of the language of the Charter itself. Just as the Charter contains
no explicit qualification indicating that the prohibition on the use of force is

only to be effective if the United Nations itself is effective in controlling international violence, neither does the Charter invite an alternative higher level
of legal analysis regarding the legality of particular uses of force. As noted
above, article 2(4)'s obligation to refrain from the use of force is absolute.

During the San Francisco Conference in 1945, a proposal that could have supplied the basis for the argument that the article's prohibition is not absolute
received consideration by Conference delegates and was rejected. The proposal
would have altered the first of "the Purposes" of the United Nations, as stated
in article 1(1), to be the maintenance of international peace and security "in

conformity with the principles of justice and international law."' 2' Had that
qualification been adopted, the use of force would not have been inconsistent

with a purpose of the United Nations simply because it hampered the maintenance of international peace and security. Only force that hampered just and

lawful peace and security would be inconsistent with the Charter. Any final
determination of whether a specific use of force violated the Charter would

necessitate consideration of a variety of contextual factors, both objective and
subjective. Since there could be occasions in which the use of force would

advance a just and lawful peace, some uses of force would produce no inconsistency with article 1 of the Charter. As it stands, however, the Charter's
prohibition of force is extraordinarily strict and does not accept the use of force
simply because it is designed to advance justice and international law.'2
121. Doc. 742, I/1/23, 6 U.N.C.LO. Docs. 318 (1945). Another proposal that also failed would
have inserted "justice" between "security" and "and to that end." Id. See also Doc. 885, 1/1/34, 6
U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 393-95 (1945); Doc. 926, 111/36, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 422-23 (1945); Doc. 944,
I/I/34/(1), 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 453 (1945). Before unanimously adopting the language of the first
Committee, which eventually became article 1(1) of the Charter, Commission 1 considered and
rejected another attempt to insert "in conformity with the principles of justice and international law."
Doc. 1179, 1/9(1), 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 245-46 (1945); Doc. 1187, 1/13, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 203
(1945).
122. The reference to "the principles of justice and international law" that appears in article 1(1)
does not state a purpose of the United Nations; it merely points out the requisite character of the
terms of a peaceful resolution to an international dispute. U.N. CHRTER art. 1. Therefore, one
cannot argue that a use of force to promote justice and international law is a use of force that
advances one of the purposes of the international organization.
But, article 2(3) of the Charter refers to "international peace and security, and justice." Id. art.
2 (emphasis added). While it cannot be maintained that the reference sets out a purpose of the
United Nations that might be promoted by the use of force, it might be argued that article 2(3)
states an exception for the use of force that is otherwise prohibited under article 2(4). See J.STONE,
OF LAW AND NATIONS 5, 8 (1974). Despite this argument, the location in article 2(3) of the reference
to "justice" suggests that it was included only to affect the nature of settlements of international
disputes. See L. GoonRci, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, supra note 88, at 27-28, 41.
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The 1974 Definition of Aggression presents another problem with the secondtier criteria approach.1 23 The opening article of the Definition characterizes intervention to protect nationals as illegal aggression because the intervention is
inconsistent with the objectives of the United Nations Charter. 2 4 The language
of article 2 of the Definition cannot save such intervention from censure because article 6 prevents the Definition from broadening the scope of cases for
which the use of force is permitted.1 25 Article 5 of the Definition provides that
"[n]o consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military,
or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggression." 26 Consequently, it
appears that the use of force to protect nationals, an act considered by the
Definition to be illegal aggression, cannot be justified by reference to the surrounding circumstances. The restrictive approach in article 5 would not have
been chosen if the General Assembly had believed that exceptions should be
permitted.
The final problem with the idea that the legitimacy of the use of force is
ultimately determined by reference to factors that can mitigate or overcome
rule-oriented appraisals of illegality arises from two recent opinions of the International Court of Justice. In the first, the Case Concerning United States
Diplomatic and ConsularStaff in Tehran,2 7 the Court had occasion to comment
on the failed United States attempt to rescue the hostages held in Iran. Although accepting that Iran held the hostages in contravention of all precepts of
international law, the Court could not bring itself to endorse the United States
action. Judges Morozov'28 and Tarazi 29 condemned the action, with the thirteen other judges joining with the majority in holding that the action was an
"incursion" that, "from whatever motive, [was] of a kind calculated to undermine respect for the judicial process" initiated in November of 1979.1° If circumstances such as these are not viewed as sufficiently mitigating to overcome
rules and constitute lawful conduct, some hesitancy should be expressed by
others urging such an approach.
The Court's 1986 opinion in Military and ParamilitaryActivities In and
Against Nicaragua' evidenced a similar aversion to claims that use of force
is lawful when based on justifiable humanitarian objectives. Admittedly, the
dispute between Nicaragua and the United States did not involve the maltreat-

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Supra note 113.
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text.
Definition of Aggression, supra note 113, art. 5, at 143.
Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran) 1980 I.CJ.

3.
128. Id. at 51, 56-57 (Morozov, J. dissenting).
129. Id. at 58, 64-65 (Tarazi, 3. dissenting).
130. Id. para. 93 (emphasis added).
131. Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment of June 27).
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ment of United States nationals, as did the earlier dispute between the United
States and Iran. Nevertheless, one of the contentions advanced by the United
States to justify its military activity in Nicaragua related to ongoing human
rights violations said to have been committed by Nicaragua's ruling Sandinista
government. In response to this contention, the Court observed that "the use
of force by the United States could not be the appropriate method ... to insure
respect for [human rights]."'1 32 While it is possible that such a clear statement
would not have been voiced had the claim of humanitarianism involved protection of United States nationals, the Court's disapproval of the use of force in
the narrower circumstances of a claim to redress the violation of human rights
seems beyond doubt.
Ill. "SELF-DEFENSE" PROTECTION THEORY

Other theories aside, the inherent right of self-defense 33 recognized by article
51 of the United Nations Charter has also provided a basis for arguing the
legitimacy of the protection of nationals subjected to maltreatment while located
in another country. 34 But, as discussed above, the text of article 51 refers to
the right existing whenever an armed attack occurs "against a Member of the
United Nations;"'1 35 therefore, it would seem difficult to view any claim to selfdefense as legitimate in the absence of a specific border violation or trespass
on the territory of the retaliating state. Setting aside instances in which
maltreatment of individuals accompanies an attack on naval vessels, aircraft,
vehicles, bases, installations, embassies, compounds, or offices of one state located in another state, 136 at least two explanations might be advanced for the
use of force to deal with attacks on individuals. One explanation is that an
attack on nationals abroad is indeed an attack on the nationals' home state,
whenever the attack is motivated by political hostility. 37 The other explanation
maintains that the adoption of article 51 has not displaced the traditional law
3
of self-defense, which included the defense of nationals abroad.' 1

132. Id. at 134 (para. 268).
133. On the inherent nature of the right of self-defense, the United States delegate to the drafting
of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty of 1928 observed that the right "is inherent in every sovereign state
and is implicit in every treaty."
1 U.S. FOREIGN REL. 36 (1928).
134. THE DOMINICAN CRISIS 1965, at 11-24 (R.W. Mansbach ed. 1971). See, e.g., Bowett, The
Use of Force in the Protection of Nationals, 43 TRANS. GROi. Soc'Y 111, 117 (1957); Fawcett,
supra note 6, at 360-63, 365-69; Fitzmaurice, supra note 6, at 171-74; Waldock, supra note 6 at

467.
135. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
136. For the view that an attack on naval vessels, aircraft, or other property alone constitutes an
attack on the "state," see Schachter, supra note 1,.at 1636.
137. See id. at 1632; Schachter, supra note 27, at 139, n.107.
138. See, e.g., Waldock, supra note 6, at 496-98.
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A. Attack on Nationals Abroad is an Attack on a "Member"

The idea that an attack on nationals abroad is an attack on the home state
of the nationals seems difficult to accept, even when there is evidence of political motivation. Article 51 affirms the right of self-defense in response to an
attack against a "Member," a state belonging to the United Nations. 39 Other
provisions of the Charter seem to indicate that the term "Member" does not
include attacks on nationals of a member state when such nationals are located
beyond that state's borders. 140 In each of these provisions, "Member" refers to
nothing more than the territorial and governmental entity known as a state. Article 2(4) of the Charter, in some respects the other side of the self-defense
coin, provides an excellent illustration of this point. Article 2(4)'s obligation
to refrain from the threat or use of force is enjoined on "Members.' 141 While
the applicability of the obligation to non-members might be questioned, 42 there
seems to be no doubt that it does not apply to individuals acting on their own
and without state supervision or assistance. 43 Article 2(6), which obligates the
United Nations itself to ensure that non-members act in accordance with the
principles of the organization to the extent necessary to maintain international
peace, 144 uses the term "Members" in precisely the same way. Indeed, it
specifically provides that this obligation is designed so that "states which are
not Members"' 45 follow the Charter. With the possible exception of inserting
a definition of "Member" in the Charter itself, it would seem hard to imagine
a clearer way of establishing that "Member" refers to "states." Any uncertainty
in this regard is addressed by articles 3 and 4(1). Article 3 notes that the
original "Members" of the United Nations shall be the "states" participating in
the San Francisco Conference, 146 and article 4(1) indicates that "Membership"
is open to all other peace-loving "states."' 47
Another reason that use of force in response to a politically motivated attack
upon nationals abroad cannot be justified is that the right to self-defense pos-

139. States that are not members of the United Nations would be entitled to exercise self-defense,
but only by virtue of traditional international law, not through article 51 of the Charter.
140. See discussion of articles 2(4), 2(6), 3, and 4(1), infra notes 141-47.
141. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
142. See L. HENKiN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMrr, INTERNATIONAL LAw: CASES AND
MATEiALS 910 (1st ed. 1980) (article 2(4) has been accepted into the corpus of customary international law and therefore binds member and non-member states alike). See also D. Bowarr, supra
note 6, at 152-53.
143. One commentator argues that in the absence of control by one state over individuals located
in another state, even giving military aid to such individuals would be insufficient to conclude that
a "Member" has used force upon another state in violation of article 2(4). I. BROWNLIE, supra note
6, at 370. If that is so, unaided attacks upon a state by individuals not under the control of another
state would compel the same conclusion.
144. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 6.
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. Id. arL3.
147. Id. art. 4, para. 1.
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sessed by each "Member" state under article 51 of the Charter 148 is a right to
defense of "self." 149 By its very nature, article 51 is designed to permit states

to take up arms in legitimate defense of themselves when attacked. 150 An attack
by one state that threatens the security or independence of another state would
justify a claim of self-defense, but the same could not be said for an attack on
a state's nationals while those nationals are outside of the state's territory and
in the territory of the attacking state.' 5 ' To imperil the safety of nationals

abroad is not ipsofacto to imperil the security or independence of the nationals'
home state. Even in instances where the number of nationals threatened with

or suffering an attack is significant, there would be no attack on the state itself,
since it would be difficult to imagine a situation where an attack on nationals
abroad jeopardizes the actual survival of the state itself.1 52 To the extent that

148. On the role of proportionality in protection cases, see D. BowETr, supra note 6, at 93-94.
149. See R. HIGGINs, supra note 53, at 220; Wright, United States Intervention in Lebanon, 53
AM. J. INT'L L. 112, 116-17 (1959).
150. All uses of force do not rise to the level of an "attack" under article 51. M. McDOUGAL
& F. FELICIANO, supra note 6, at 227 (attack requires "severe deprivations of values so important
that their loss or destruction will substantially impair the functioning of the territorially organized
community or preclude its continued existence as a distinct polity"). See Brownlie, International
Law and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 INT'L & COT. L.Q. 712, 731 (1958) ("grave breach of
the peace, or invasion of a large organized force" is required); Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental
Principles of InternationalLaw, 87 RECiEIL DES Cotns 195, 333 (1955) (self-defense invoked to
protect "vital, or at least important, rights or interests").
151. One might question whether the use of force by one state which resulted in a trespass to
the border of another state would entitle the violated state to use force in self-defense. Such situations might include "frontier incidents" (e.g., guards firing across the demilitarized zone separating
North and South Korea) or raids by armed bands resulting in death or injury to the nationals of the
state that was raided (e.g., the Pancho Villa incident). For positions on "frontier incidents," see I.
BROWNUE, supra note 6, at 366 (skeptical about force used in "frontier incidents" being defended
as self-defense); M. McDouGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 6, at 227-28 (apparently taking the same
view, though not expressly stating it, since the presence or absence of territorial trespass was not
viewed as determinative). With respect to raids by armed bands, there is no doubting the right of
self-defense against an ongoing attack. With respect to pre-Charter law and the pursuit of attackers
into their countries of origin, see infra notes 183-204 and accompanying text. D. BowErr, supra
note 6, at 38-41 (considering it to be too similar to impermissible reprisal to be self-defense in most
cases); P. JEssup, A Modem Law of Nations 165-66, 168 (1948) (hesitant to characterize such actions
as lawful self-defense). On post-Charter law, see Brownlie, supra note 150, at 731-34 (doubtful
that it qualifies as self-defense).
Another question is whether self-defense can be invoked only in the context of a territorial trespass
threatening security or independence. This relates to whether modalities that can be imposed from
outside the borders of the target state, such as economic or political coercion, can also trigger selfdefense. D. BowTr, supra note 6, at 106-14. On this, see, M. McDouGAL & F. Ftacmo, supra
note 6, at 240-41.
152. But see D. BowETr, supra note 6, at 92-93; M. McDoUGAL & F. FEaCIANO, supra note 6,
at 228; W. MALUISON & S. MALLISON, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM 306-09 (1986) (taking the position
that attacks on a small number of nationals abroad do not trigger self-defense, although expressing
no view on whether attacks on a large number of nationals would permit responsive action under
article 51). Cf. I. BROWNLE, supra note 6, at 301 (protection of nationals is not legitimate under
article 51, but compelling reasons do exist for the state to act).
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article 51 limits the use of force to occasions capable of threatening a state's
survival or its political freedom, there would be little possibility of justification
for military measures to protect nationals abroad on the basis of the right to
self-defense in the Charter.
B. Article 51 Did Not Displace TraditionalRight to Protect
If the bases for adopting article 51 had nothing to do with decreasing traditional self-defense and the history of article 2(4) suggests that self-defense
"remains" admitted and unimpaired, then the traditional right of self-defense,
which included the right to protect nationals, survived the adoption of the
Charter.15 3 The essence of this argument is that article 51 simply speaks to a
right of self-defense if an armed attack occurs on a member state, and does
not address whether or not such a right exists in other circumstances. 154 The
article states that "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of

. .

. self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United

Nations."' 155 The negotiating history of the Charter must be reviewed to determine whether a right of self-defense exists in situations involving something
other than an armed attack on a member state. This history reveals that selfdefense, as conceived in traditional international law, was left unaffected by
the document's adoption. The Report of the Rapporteur of Committee 1 to
Commission I at the San Francisco Conference indicates that despite the
Charter's prohibition on the use of force, "self-defense remains admitted and
unimpaired.' 5 6 Furthermore, the objective in adopting article 51 was simply
to integrate the system envisioned by the Charter with existing mutual defense
arrangements. 157
A major weakness in this argument is whether or not the right to protect
nationals was part of the traditional concept of self-defense at the time of the
adoption of the Charter. One indication that it was not part of that concept
lies in the absence of any reference to either the doctrine of self-defense or the
rule of the Caroline incident, regarded as the principal illustration of selfdefense. 5 8 An examination of some of the most frequently cited episodes involving the use of force by the United States and Great Britain, the modem
proponents of the self-defense theory, during the one hundred years prior to
1945, corroborates the assertion that neither of those states relied on the theory
of self-defense to justify protection of nationals.

153. D. Bow-rr, supra note 6, at 87-105. See Waldock, supra note 6, at 466-67, 496-98, 503.
154. See D. Bowfrr, supra note 6, at 187-88.

155. U.N.

CHARTER

art. 51.

156. Doc. 885, 1/1/34, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 400 (1945) (emphasis added).
157. See M. McDouoAL & F. Fm.ICIANo, supra note 6, at 235; Waldock, supra note 6, at 496-97.
158. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 299-300 (expressing this concern).
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For example, the United States intervened in Vera Cruz, Mexico in 1860 to
protect United States citizens from threats by hostile forces. The unsettled state
of affairs in Mexico found the government of populist Benito Juarez in Vera
Cruz face to face with the Miramon government based in Mexico City. Eventually Juarez prevailed, only to be ousted shortly thereafter by the French, who
established Archduke Maximilian as emperor.' 59 During the Juarez-Miramon
struggle, the United States minister in Vera Cruz, Mr. McLane, was directed
to request the landing of forces from nearby United States naval vessels if he
considered the political hostility dangerous to American lives or property. The
6
action properly should be considered one of protection, not of self-defense.'1
Likewise, several motivations prompted the United States 1898 intervention
in Cuba, then controlled by Spain. These included territorial expansion, the
desire to satiate interventionist sentiment stimulated by the Yellow Journalism
of the times, and avenging the February 15, 1898 destruction of the United
States battleship Maine in Havana harbor, which left countless people dead and
injured.' 6' Intervention by the United States occurred in the context of a long
and bloody period of revolt by Cuban insurrectionists against the Spanish
colonial government, which pursued responsive measures that shocked the
United States. 62 President McKinley's April 11, 1898 message to Congress
declared that intervention would be justified on four separate grounds, one of
which was that "[w]e owe to our citizens in Cuba to afford them protection
and indemnity for life and property which no government there can or will afford.' ' 63 McKinley did not seek to justify intervention by a right of selfdefense. On April 25, 1898, the United States declared war on Spain.
The United States and Great Britain also justified their intervention in the
Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900 with the claim of protecting nationals, again
without reference to the right of self-defense.164 The troubles in China, which
began as anti-foreign sentiment, threatened the frequently unprotected missionaries operating in the countryside as well as the diplomatic legations and
associated personnel stationed in Peking. 65 An international force of approximately nineteen thousand troops was sent in to quell the disturbance.' 66
In a July 3, 1900 diplomatic circular from Secretary of State John Hay (often
described as the second "open door" note' 67 because of its recognition of the
territorial integrity of China), the United States indicated that its contribution
to the international expeditionary force was prompted by an interest "first, in
159.

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See R FERRELL, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY: A HIsToRY 274-75 (3d ed. 1975).
See 2 J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INMRNA'nONAL LAW 400 (1906).
See R. FERRELL, supra note 159, at 347-57.

Id. at 350.
U.S. 750, 757-58 (1898).
See infra notes 173-81 and accompanying text.
See 5 J. MOORE, A DiGE r OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 476-81 (1906).
See R. FERRELL, supra note 159, at 376.
Id. at 375-76.
FOREIGN REL.
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opening up communications with Peking and rescuing the American officials,
missionaries, and other Americans who are in danger; secondly, in affording
all possible protection everywhere in China to American life and property
....

18

Great Britain agreed with this position.t69

When the United States intervened in Nicaragua in late 1926 and early 1927,
the claim of protecting nationals was again advanced. Nicaragua was in the
midst of a civil war that pitted conservatives, under the leadership of long-time
United States ally Adolfo Diaz, against the liberal, revolutionary forces headed
by Dr. Juan Sacasa.1 70 The situation was thought to threaten United States
citizens living and working in Nicaragua. President Coolidge dispatched
Marines to the area to establish neutral zones. By March 1927 the troops numbered almost two thousand. 171 The United States Department of State justified
the intervention by arguing that the Marines had landed "to maintain the neutral
zones and protect Americans and other foreign lives and property.' 1 72 The State
Department did not rely on self-defense as supporting a right of protection.
In January 1927 three brigades of British soldiers under the command of
Major-General John Duncan were ordered to Shanghai, China.173 Earlier that
month, unruly mobs, teeming with nationalist fervor ignited by leaders such as
Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, attacked British citizens in the city. 174 On
January 27 of that year, the first detachments of British troops arrived. 175 A
communique from Great Britain to the League of Nations Secretariat justified
the intervention as being necessary for the protection of British nationals.
Again, the communique made no reference to the intervention as being one of
self-defense.

176

The final incident of intervention to protect nationals abroad involving the
United States or Great Britain during this time period involved the landing of
American Marines in Fukien Province in southern China, during January
1934.177 On November 20, 1933, General Tsai Ting-kai declared the Fukien

168. FOREIGN REL. U.S. 299 (1900).
169. Id. at 345 (a July 7, 1900 expression of agreement by Britain's Foreign Secretary, Lord
Salisbury).
170. See R. FERRELL, supra note 159, at 412-13.
171. 1 C. HYDE, INTERNAmTONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNrrED
STATES 271, n.1 (1945).
172. Id.
173. See 9 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 228 (1928).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Letter from the British Government to the Secretary-General of the League, Feb. 8, 1927,

para. 6, LEAGUE OF NArnONS OJ. 292, 293 (1927).

The indication is that the dispatch of troops

was a "precautionary measure ...required for the protection of the British community at Shanghai."
(emphasis added). The Letter's reference to "self-defence" by marine guards then present does not
detract from this indication, since the self-defense referenced in the Letter was in an individual
capacity; it did not reference self-defense by the state.
177. See I C. HYDE, supra note 171, at 648, n.8.
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Province independent from the Chinese Nationalist Government. By the middle
of January 1934, the Nationalists had dispatched a naval landing party to the
Province. 178 In the estimation of Mr. Burke, United States Vice Consul for the
area, the ensuing conflict with the rebellious forces under General Tsai's com-

mand was endangering nationals residing in the vicinity. Mr. Burke apparently
requested military protection for the nationals, which was provided when the

United States, under the charge of Commander Reinicke, landed Marines at
Foochow. 179 Self-defense was never officially raised as a justification for
Reinicke's action.' 80 Given the then existing Navy regulations governing the
use of force to protect nationals abroad, the absence of a self-defense argument

may have been the result of justifying this action under the broader concept of
8

self-preservation.1 '
Prior to the adoption of the Charter, states repeatedly cited self-defense as

the justification for invading a neighboring state to protect nationals at home
against armed bands that would violate national boundaries, invade foreign ter-

ritory, complete their attacks, and flee back across national boundaries to avoid
repercussions.'

82

Four important incidents reflect this practice and support the

notion that states recognized the difference between defense of self and defense
of nationals abroad.
The first incident concerned Major-General, and later President, Andrew
Jackson's expedition into Florida in 1818 against Seminole Indians under

178. See 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 353 (1934); CURRENT HISTORY, Feb.-March 1934.
179. See 1 C. HYDE, supra note 171, at 648, n.8.
180. See 3 FOREIGN REt.. U.S. 462-67 (1951).
181. See UNtrED STATES NAVY REGuLATIONS (1932). Section 722 of the Regulations states:
On occasions where injury to the United States or to citizens thereof is committed or
threatened, in violation of the principles of international law or treaty rights, the commander in chief shall consult with the diplomatic representative or consul of the United
States, and take such steps as the gravity of the case demands, reporting immediately to
the Secretary of the Navy all the facts. The responsibility for any action taken by a naval
force, however, rests wholly upon the commanding officer thereof.
Id., quoted in Woodward, The Relations Between the Navy and the Foreign Service, 33 AM. J. INT'L
L. 283, 286-87 (1939).
Section 723 implies the preceding by stating:
The use of force against a foreign and friendly state, or against anyone within the territories
thereof, is illegal. The right of self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to
States as well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the protection of the
State, its honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, whereby the State or its citizens may suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the application of the right of self-preservation
cannot be defined before-hand, but must be left to the sound judgment of responsible
officers, who are to perform their duties in this respect with all possible care and forbearance ....
Id. at 286-87.
Section 723 notably does not refer to the right of self-defense, but to the broader notion of selfpreservation.
182. See D. Bowmr, supra note 6, at 38-39; Brownlie, supra note 150, at 732.
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Spanish control. 183 Spain controlled Florida through the Pinckney Treaty of
1795184 and had agreed to restrain Indians in the area from conducting raids on
Americans living along the frontier. 185 Spain was either unable or unwilling to
do this, which led the United States to take action against what Secretary of
State John Quincy Adams described as a "horrible combination of robbery, murder, and war, with which the frontier of the United States bordering Florida
has for several years past been visited."' 18 6 In the late winter and the early
spring of 1818, Jackson crossed into Florida, attacked the Seminoles, secured
a Spanish fortress at St. Mark's, and moved westward to occupy Pensacola,
where he understood the Indians enjoyed free access. 187 Jackson's activities
were defended by Secretary Adams as "a necessary measure of self-defense.", 88
The second incident occurred in 1836, when the territory of Texas was in
revolt against the Mexican government, and Indian hostilities in the territory
aroused fear in United States officials. An 1831 treaty, 189 similar to the
Pinckney Treaty, existed between the United States and Mexico obligating
Mexico to restrain Indians deemed likely to attack frontier settlements. 90 In a
series of diplomatic exchanges between Secretary of State John Forsyth and the
Mexican Minister to Washington, Mr. Gorostiza, the United States expressed
concern over the Indian raids from across the border and indicated that necessity
might compel pursuing Indian raiders back to Mexico. 191 A December 10, 1836
communique from Secretary Forsyth to Mr. Ellis, the American Minister to
Mexico, justified such pursuit as resting "upon principles of the law of nations,
entirely distinct from those on which war is justified-upon the immutable prin1 92
ciples of self-defense."
The third incident in which intervention to pursue armed bands was sought
to be justified as self-defense arose when, in accordance with the rationale expressed in Secretary Forsyth's 1836 statement, the United States military pursued marauding Indians back into Mexican territory on several occasions during
the nineteenth century. 93 Mexican claims arising from such actions resulted
in the appointment of a commission of experts by the United States Secretary
of War in August 1912. After some reflection, the commission followed the

183.
184.
185.
186.
Luis de
187.

See R. FERRELL, supra note 159, at 161-65.
Pinckney Treaty, art. V, T.S. No. 325, 11 Bevans 516, entered into force Apr. 25, 1796.
See 2 J. MooRE, supra note 160, at 404-05.
Id. at 405 (letter from Secretary of State Adams to Spanish Minister to Washington, Don
Onis, dated Nov. 30, 1818).
See 2 J. MooRE, supra note 160, at 403-04.

188. Id. at 405-06 (Instructions from Secretary of State Adams to the U.S. Minister to Madrid,
Mr. Erving, Nov. 28, 1818).
189. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, art. 33, T.S. No. 203, 9 Bevans 764, entered
into force Apr. 5, 1832.
190. See 2 J. MooRE, supra note 160, at 420.
191. Id. at 418-20.
192. Id. at 420.
193. Id. at 421-24.
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longstanding position that the use of force in pursuing armed bands across international boundaries was acceptable in international law and grounded on a
"right of self-defense ... superior in the particular circumstances to the right
194
of territorial inviolability."'
Finally, there were the series of cross-border raids of the notorious Mexican
bandit Pancho Villa. These raids arose during a period of violent political strife
in Mexico, marked by the power struggle between Venustiano Carranza, who
had deposed President Victoriano Huerta in August 1914,195 and Villa, who had
originally supported Carranza. Villa and other bandits operated in northern
Mexico near the United States border. As early as September 1915, the bandits
raided Americans living in Texas, 196 and apparently continued to do so
throughout that year.197 On January 11, 1916, in Santa Ysabel, Villa seized
and subsequently executed American college students travelling under safe conduct passes from the Carranza government. 198 Following his attack on Columbus, New Mexico on March 9, 1916, which resulted in several deaths and in
the burning of the town, 99 President Wilson ordered 6,000 United States troops,
under the command of Brigadier-General John J. Pershing, to pursue Villa into
Mexico. 2 00 Raids by Mexican bandits on Glen Springs, Texas on May 5, 1916
resulted in another American expedition into Mexico on May 10 of that same
year.20' United States Secretary of State Robert Lansing defended both of these
efforts to pursue Mexican bandits in a June 20, 1916 communication to the
Mexican Foreign Secretary. Though Lansing did not explicitly mention selfdefense, he did state that the efforts were measures of "hot pursuit: 20 2
American commentators of the time considered such measures to be an aspect
of self-defense. 20 3 As these incidents illustrate, there was no strong basis for
a claim of self-defense justifying use of force to address attacks on nationals
abroad in the Pre-Charter era. Self-defense claims were used to justify the use
of force only in instances in which the territorial boundaries of the defending
state had been violated.
Aside from the evidence suggesting a separation of the traditional right to
protect nationals from the concept of self-defense as it existed prior to the adop-

194. 2 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 289 (1941).
195. See R. FERRELL, supra note 159, at 420-21.
196. See FOREIGN REL. U.S. 581-82 (1916) (letter from U.S., Secretary of State Lansing to the
Mexican Foreign Secretary).
197. Id. at 582 (referring to the October 1915 attack on a train seven 'miles north of Brownsville,
Texas).
198.

See R. FERRELL, supra note 159, at 421.

199. See 1 C. HYDE, supra note 171, at 241.
200. See R. FERRELL, supra note 159, at 421-22.
201. See I C. HYDE, supra note 171, at 242.
202. FOREIGN RF.. U.S. 581, 588 (1916).
203. See, e.g., 2 J. MOoRE, supra note 160, at 418-25 (classifying !he pursuit of marauders under
the general heading of "Plea of Necessary Self-Defense"); Hershey, Incursions into Mexico and the
Doctrine of Hot Pursuit, 13 AM. J. INTL L. 568 (1919).
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tion of the Charter, the argument that the adoption of article 51 did not displace
the traditional right to intervene for the benefit of nationals abroad has a second
weakness. As noted earlier, the Charter envisioned only action of a collective,
and not a unilateral, nature to enforce or secure human rights.204 The reference

to "separate" action to promote human rights in article 56 of the Charter was
apparently intended to do nothing more than require each nation to take
20 5 It
measures within its own territory to assure the observance of such rights.
seems peculiar that the traditional right to resort to the unilateral use of force
to protest the maltreatment of nationals abroad would be preserved by article
26
51 of the Charter while being renounced elsewhere in that same instrument.

The only explanation is that the drafters of the Charter wanted to subject this
traditional right to the same limitations that were imposed on the exercise of
the right of self-defense. While the plausibility of this explanation is supported

by the fact that critics of the argument advocating the survival of the traditional

20 7
right have acknowledged that the right itself was not under similar limitations,

there is absolutely nothing in the negotiating documents concerning article 51
to even remotely suggest that this was one of the purposes behind the incor208
poration of that provision into the Charter itself.
Another weakness in the argument that the traditional right was not displaced
by article 51 is found in the International Court of Justice opinion regarding

the dispute between the United States and Iran in

19 80

.209 The majority found

the United States rescue attempt to be an incursion that undermined respect for
the previously instituted judicial process. 210 Justices Morozov and Tarazi
evaluated the action more harshly and thought it to be clearly unsupportable

by article 51.211 The argument that the ratification of the right of self-defense
in article 51 includes the traditional right to use force to protect nationals abroad

204. See supra notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
206. On the rejection of broader language that may have permitted unilateral actions, see supra
notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 299-300.
208. On the principal purpose for the adoption of article 51, see sources cited supra note 159.
209. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran) 1980 I.CJ. 3.
210. Id. at 43.
211. J. Morozov argued:
Article 51 of the Charter, establishing the right of self-defence, may be invoked only 'if
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.' [The opinion of the
Court] should have added that in the documentation officially presented by the United
States to the Court in response to its request relating to the events of 24-25 April, 1980,
there is no evidence that any armed attack had occurred against the United States.
Id. at 56-57. J. Tarazi argued:
Yet Article 51 provides for the eventuality of that kind of operation only 'if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.' One can only wonder, therefore,
whether an armed attack attributable to the Iranian Government has been committed against
the territory of the United States, apart from its Embassy and Consulates in Iran.
Id. at 64-65.
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suggests that force used to protect nationals would be lawful whenever article
51 is properly consulted. Therefore, the only question that should occupy those
having to decide an issue of self-defense would be the question of what facts
actually existed, because if protection efforts are lawful in principle, then the
facts alone determine lawfulness in a particular situation. Yet even the majority
opinion in the Hostage Case did not concern itself with whether the facts justified the United States action. The justices appeared to assume that only selfdefense permitted the unilateral use of force and that self-defense did not
include the protection of nationals abroad. The Court gives little regard to the
argument that the protection of nationals abroad survived the adoption of article
51 of the Charter.
United Nations practice related to whether article 51 includes the traditional
right to use force for the protection of nationals abroad also merits examination.
Several claims that involved the protection of nationals abroad and eventually
led to United Nations consideration were disputed as to their factual sufficiency.
These incidents included Great Britain's actions to protect nationals during the
Suez Crisis of 1956,212 the United States intervention in Lebanon in 1958,213
the Dominican Republic situation of 1965,214 the Mayaquez incident of 1975,215
and the invasion of Grenada in 1983.216 Two incidents that cannot be factually
disputed, however, are the rescue operation in the Congo in 1964 by the United
States and Belgium and the Israeli raid on Entebbe Airport in 1976. Thus,
these incidents cast light on whether the United Nations recognizes the traditional right to protect nationals abroad as part of the right of self-defense
guaranteed by article 51 of the Charter.
In the Congo, the Leopoldville central government under the leadership of
Prime Minister Moise Tshombe had been contending with rebels led by Christopher Gbenye. The rebels had taken approximately one thousand residents as
hostages. The hostages were citizens of eighteen nations, including the United
States and Belgium, and were held in Stanleyville. When the concessions that
the rebels demanded from Tshombe were not met, thirty-five of the hostages,
including nineteen Belgians, two Americans, and one Englishman, were

212. See, e.g., D. BowETr, supra note 6, at 104; I. BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 297; R. IGGn s,
supra note 53, at 221.
213. Compare R. HIGGINS, supra note 53, at 221 (not warranted) with Potter, Legal Aspects of
the Beirut Landing, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 727, 728 (1958) (warranted).
214. Compare HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 53, at 80-81 (comment of Harry Almond
to the effect that the facts warranted intervention) with sources cited in Nanda, The United States'
Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order-Part1, 43 DENVER L.J. 439, 464-65
(1966) (unwarranted on the facts).
215. Compare Paust, The Seizure and Recovery of the Mayaquez, 85 YALE L.J. 774, 800 (1976)
(unwarranted) with Finch, Pueblo and Mayaquez: A Legal Analysis, 9 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L.
79, 108-10 (1977) (warranted on facts, but questions whether diplomatic efforts had been exhausted).
216. Compare Boyle, InternationalLawlessness in Grenada, 78 AM. 3. INT'L L. 172 (1984) (the
Reagan administration did not establish "that there did in fact exist an immediate threat to the safety
of U.S. citizens in Grenada") with MOORE, supra note 19, at 12 (warranted on facts).
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executed. 217 The Gbenye faction indicated that "we will make our fetishes with
the hearts of the Americans and Belgians .. . and dress ourselves with the
skins of the Americans and Belgians. ' '2 8 A captured telegram from a rebel
219
general to a field commander indicated that more executions would follow.
Beginning on November 24, 1964, United States aircraft operating from Ascension Island in the South Atlantic dropped Belgian commandos into the rebel
stronghold to begin the rescue operation.220 The United States Department of
State reported at first that American participation in the mission was justified
"in exercise of our clear responsibility to protect United States citizens under
the circumstances existing in the Stanleyville area."' 1 Later, the State Department indicated that the United States had been invited to participate by the
Tshombe government .2 2 In any case, the mission succeeded in evacuating all
2 23
but about sixty to eighty Europeans.
In the United Nations Security Council there was prolonged discussion of the
rescue operation. 224 The final result was the unanimous adoption of Security
Council Resolution 199, as proposed by the Ivory Coast and Morocco and
amended by Guinea.225 The most relevant portion of the Resolution provided
that-the Security Council "[r]equests all States to refrain or desist from intervening in the domestic affairs of the Congo.' ' 2 6 Although some might consider
the absence of any condemnation of the rescue operation as significant, given
that the Tshombe government had invited Belgium and the United States to
undertake the rescue mission, the better view would be that the pertinent language of the Resolution was not designed to address anything more than intervention by outside forces to assist the combatants in the Congo Civil War.
Intervention to rescue nationals was not addressed, as the invitation from the
Central government eliminated the need to do so. The unanimous adoption of
the Resolution supports this reading, in that Security Council members with
diametrically opposed views on the lawfulness of the operation 227 joined in
agreement on the phraseology of a particular Resolution.

217.
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219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

See Lillich, supra note 97, at 339.
52 DEP'T ST. BULL 18 (1965).
See Reisman & McDougal, supra note 54, at 185.
See L. SoHN, THE UNrrED NATIONS IN ACrION 268, note (1968).
51 DEP"T ST. BULL. 841 (1964).
See Cleveland, The Evolution of Rising Responsibility, 52 DEPr ST. BULL 7, 9 (1965).
See Franek & Rodley, After Bangledesh: The Law of HumanitarianIntervention by Military
Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275, 288 (1973).
224.. See 2 UN MoNTHLY CHRON. 7-21 (1965) (reviewing the eleven Security Council meetings
on the rescue mission).
225. See L. SoHN, supra note 220.
226. S.C. Res., 19 U.N. SCOR at 19, U.N. Doc. S/INF/19/Rev. 1 (1964).
227. On the one hand, the United States argued that the mission was lawful, see 2 UN MomTmY
CHRON., supra note 224, at 10, 13, while the Soviet Union, among others, argued that it violated
international law, see id. at 19.
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The facts of the Entebbe incident have been detailed above.22 The Security
Council proposed two draft resolutions after the Ambassador of Mauritius
placed the issue of the Israeli commando raid before the Council. One resolution, sponsored by Benin, Libya, and Tanzania, condemned the raid as a flagrant
violation of international law,229 while the other resolution, sponsored by the
United States and the United Kingdom, condemned hijacking and other matters,
but did not explicitly deal with the legality of Israel's rescue effort.23o Neither
of the two proposals was adopted.23l The drafi condemning hijacking failed to
obtain the necessary two-thirds vote, 2 while the other draft was never sub33
mitted for a vote.?
The Security Council's lack of comment on the raid on Entebbe prompted
Israel to conclude that the Council recognized that the action was consistent
with international legal principles.2m However, as with Security Council
Resolution 199 addressing the Congo intervention in 1964, the Council's
failure to voice any opinion on the Israeli operation could be seen as expressing
no opinion at all on whether the Security Council viewed the traditional right
to protect nationals as having survived the adoption of article 51. Only six
states had supported the hijacking resolution, which had implicitly seemed to
accept Israel's action as lawful,235 while the seven states that refused to participate contended that in addressing the hijacking itself the draft resolution
went far beyond the scope of the matter being considered. 236 During the
Security Council debates, several of the same seven states strongly criticized
the Israeli commando operation?237 That criticism was never converted into an
official Security Council position, since the other draft resolution that would
have accomplished that objective was withheld from formal vote. Israel's conclusion, therefore, would seem incorrect because the resolution implicitly
embracing the idea of the continuation of the traditional right to protect nationals was formally rejected. It would also be incorrect to conclude that the rejection of that draft resolution demonstrated Security Council disapprobation of
the survival of the right to protect nationals abroad. The states supporting that
approach did not take the opportunity provided by the draft proposed by Benin,
Libya, and Tanzania to establish that position in the official record of the
228. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
229. 31 U.N. SCOR Supp. (July-Sept. 1976) at 15-16, U.N. Doc. S/12139 (1976).
230. 31 U.N. SCOR Supp. (July-Sept. 1976) at 15, U.N. Doc. S/12138 (1976).
231. See 31 U.N. SCOR (1941st mtg.) at 1-21, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1941 (1976).
232. 31 U.N. SCOR (1943d mtg.) at 81, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1943 (1976).
233. See Council Fails To Adopt Draft Resolution After Considering Uganda Hijacking Issue,
UN MONrHLY CHRON., Aug.-Sept. 1976, at 15.
234. See Teltsch, Africans Abandon Anti-Israel move in U.N.'s Council, N.Y. Times, July 15,
1976, at 1, col. 1.
235. See Boyle, supra note 21, at 801.
236. See, e.g., supra note 232, at 78-80 (statement by representative from Guyana).
237. After all, the non-participants Benin, Libya, and Tanzania sponsored the counter draft resolution referenced above.
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Security Council. In the final analysis, United Nations practice is inconclusive.
The Council's failure to pass judgment on the Entebbe incident tells us no more
about the relationship between the traditional right to protect nationals and article 51 than the adoption of Security Council Resolution 199 concerning the
Congo told us in 1964.
IV. CONSENT AND OBLIGATION

In view of the preceding analysis of articles 51 and 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter, the justification for unilateral use of force to protect nationals abroad
based on legitimate self-defense appears strained at best. For purposes of argument, however, assume the even stronger case that the Charter cannot possibly be used to justify protective action on the basis of self-defense. Indeed,
after examining every appropriate item, assume the Charter was deliberately
designed to eliminate the traditional right to protect nationals abroad and that
its language on this point is perfectly clear.238 Subscribing to a conviction as
unequivocal as this would require considering force used to defend nationals
abroad as unlawful. In arriving at this determination, the operative premise
must be that consent creates legal obligation.
This kind of understanding about consent is a virtually universal belief,
embraced by the international judicial community as long ago as the Lotus
case, 239 endorsed by the members of the world community in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 240 and reiterated very recently by a prominent
foreign legal scholar.24' But, before proceeding to analyze the merits of this
widely-held traditional belief,2 42 a few thoughts will be offered about the practical significance of such a seemingly esoteric academic undertaking and about
the existence of reasons to believe that international bodies might be inclined
to accept arguments that consent does not bind.
The easiest way to demonstrate the practical significance of examining the
seemingly remote and impractical question of whether consent binds is to assume momentarily that it does not bind. The result permits conduct inconsistent
with a consensual rule to be understood as something that is not necessarily
unlawful, because a failure to do as promised would not determine the legal
238. There is reason to wonder whether language can ever be so clear, and whether what one
has consented to can ever be so certain.
239. The S.S. "Lotus," 1927 P.CI.L (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7).
240. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doe. A/39/27 (1969), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). In particular see
articles 7(1), 9(1), 11, 12(1), 13, 14(1), 14(2), 15, 16, 17(1), and 17(2) (referring to "consent of a
state to be bound"), and article 26 (pacta sunt servanda).
241. See, e.g., Lukashuk, The Principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda and the Nature of Obligation
Under InternationalLaw, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 513 (1989) (characterizing consent as "the only way
to establish rules that legally bind," and therefore suggesting that consent has the power to bind).
242. For an earlier examination, see J. BRIERLY, THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW 9-18 (1959).
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character of the act. This approach would have tremendous influence on how
actors decide to act, on how advocates decide to argue, and on how judges
decide to rule. The assumption that a particular standard does not bind one
simply through consent creates a new way of looking at legal problems, and
makes extremely valuable what would otherwise appear to be a purely theoretical discussion.
This position should not be interpreted to mean that if consent does not bind,
then states are free to disregard each and every commitment they make. There
may be another basis of obligation (e.g., sense of right, 243 social instinct,2 " or

rationality as an end 245) or, apart from obligation, another impetus for finding
that a certain consensual standard is to be observed, given the specific facts of

the situation. All that is meant by what is stated above is that if consent does
not bind, then conduct inconsistent with a consensual rule is able to be under-

stood as not "necessarily" unlawful. In other words, the mere fact that a
promise has not been kept does not automatically mean that something illegal
has occurred. The only point intended to be made concerning the practical
value of finding that consent does not bind is that, once freed from the notion
that consent creates obligation, the perspective of actors, advocates, and

decision-makers can take on an entirely new dimension.
Now to the second matter, the willingness of international bodies to accept

arguments that produce decisions contrary to the notion that consent binds. Because of the apprehension that any such direct and explicit indication could

erode respect for law generally and conventions in particular, it is difficult to
find formal statements to the effect that nations are not obligated to keep their

commitments. The International Court of Justice, for instance, has not gone
beyond the observation that occasionally nations can be bound by principles to
which they have never given their consent.2 46 This is far from saying that

243. See generally Krabbe, L'Idee moderne de l'etat, 13 RECUEIL DES CouRs 513, 570-71 (1926);
KRABBE, THE MODERN IDEA OF THE STATE (Sabina & Shephard trans. 1922).
244. See generally H. GRoTus, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS 12-13, 15-18. For a review of Grotius's
ideas, see Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 1, 24
(1946). See also L. DUGUIT, LE DROrr SociAL, LE DRorr INDIVIDUEL, ET LA TRANSFORMATION DE
L'ETAT (2d ed. 1911); Duguit, Objective Law, 20 COLUM. L. REv. 817 (1920); S. Pufendorf, De
Jure Naturae et Gentium, ¢ bk. 11, ch. El, §§ 4-5 (1672), reprinted in G. CHRIsTIE, JURISPRUDENCE:
TEXT AND READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 161, 169-71 (1972).
245. See generally Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), in KANT's CRITIQUE
F.

OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WORKS ON THE THEORY OF ETHICS (As FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS) (T. K. Abbott trans. 6th ed. 1909); I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE
REASON (M. Muller trans. 2d ed. 1921). For an examination of Kant's views on rationality as an
end, see 6 F. COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 283-343 (Image Books ed. 1985).
246. In his individual opinion in Corfu Channel, Judge Alvarez stated, "[w]e can no longer regard
sovereignty as an absolute and individual right of every state, as used to be done under the old law
founded on the individualist regime, according to which states were only bound by the rules which
they had accepted. Today . . . states are bound by many rules which have not been ordered by
their will." Id., 1949 I.CJ. at 39, 43.
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nations are not bound by the principles to which they have, consented. Nevertheless, there are subtle indications that international bodies charged with
evaluating legal claims are capable of arriving at precisely that conclusion.
Most often such indications result from the use of concepts permitting the
avoidance of obligations. The invocation of these concepts may indicate a willingness to recognize that consent is not the irrefutable standard by which to
judge one's obligation.
The most useful concept in the avoidance of consensual obligations is fls
cogens, the idea that there are certain rules of international law from which
states are simply not competent to deviate by consensual arrangement. 247 The
traditional example is the prohibition of the use of force in article 2(4) of the
Charter. 248 Regardless of one's consent to escape from that prohibition, it will
not be recognized as creating an enforceable commitment. In the words of the
International Law Commission, such an agreement is void because it conflicts
with a peremptory norm of international law from which states cannot depart,
"even by mutual consent." 249 The implication is that the enforcement of consensual arrangements is not always the most important matter. But if consent
obligates, such a proposition could never be accepted. Whether or not a consensual arrangement contravened a fundamental norm of international law, the
agreement would be enforced.
A similar concept challenging the link between consent and obligation is the
notion of equity. Article 38(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice allows the resolution of disputes ex aequo et bono ("in justice and fairness") whenever the parties so agree.250 But even in the absence of such an
agreement, equitable principles have been invoked by the Court in order to
produce decisions that the Court considered appropriate, most noticeably in the
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases51 and the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
Case. 5' As best determinable, the rationale used by the Court for the invocation of equity, without an agreement under article 38(2), rests on the idea that
equity is inherently part of the "general principles of law recognized by civi-

247. See Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMMN
169, 247, para. (1), U.N. Doc. S/6309/Rev.1 1966.
248. See generally on the jus cogens rules J. SzrucI, Jus COGENS AND TIE VIENNA CONVENTION
(1974); Alexidze, Legal Nature of Jus Cogens in Contemporary InternationalLaw, 172 RECutL DEs
CouRs 227 (1981).
249. See Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 247, at 249, para. (6).
250. Statute of the InternationalCourt of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993; art. 38, para. 2.
251. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 53, para. 98
(Judgment of Feb. 20) (delimitation of shared shelf to be undertaken in accordance with "equitable
principles").
252. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries(U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 128, 133 (Judgment of Dec. 18) (particular circumstances of the case can be considered so as to avoid inappropriate results). See also
United Kingdom-France Continental Shelf Arbitration (1977), in J. ODA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF THE OCEAN DEVELOPMENT: BASIC DoCumENTs (Supp. Oct. 1978). Decision examined in Blecher,
Equitable Delimitation of Continental Shelf, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 60 (1979).
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lized nations." 2 3 'This understanding dates back to the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice in The Diversion of Water From the
Meuse,254 and reflects the interpretation of the Court's power, under article 38,
55
considered to be the most accurate by several influential commentators.2
The use of equity and fairness as decisional principles certainly presents the
possibility of judgments that do not perfectly comport with consensual arrangements. This can result from the decision to supplement consent by identifying
interstitial principles that close gaps left by the use of consent alone (i.e.,
decisions praeterlegem), or from the decision to depart from consensual agreements and to identify controlling principles that produce judgments opposed to
what consent itself seems to direct (i.e., decisions contra legem). In the Gulf
of Maine case, the Court relied upon equitable principles to resolve a dispute
6
between Canada and the United States concerning maritime boundaries.25
Since it did so in the face of a powerful dissent by Judge Gros, who insisted
that reliance on equity rendered the decision "beyond the law," it would seem
the decision suggests that both the contra legem and the praeter legem ap57
proaches are viable alternatives for taking the edge off of consent.
The teachings of the most highly qualified scholars also weaken the theory
of consent and obligation2Ss Their writings are of lesser force in this matter,
primarily because they fail to show examples of international bodies having
recourse to notions opposed to consent when called upon to determine the lawfulness of claims made by specific actors. Nevertheless, the teachings of these
scholars are recognized as one of the sources of international law to which international judicial bodies may resort. Interestingly enough, these writers often
refer to concepts quite different from consent as being the root of international
law. Brierly, for example, extols "order, 259 De Visscher speaks of "social ends
considered desirable, ' ' 260 and McDougal expounds "reasonableness in particular
context. '26' These comments might cause a decision-making body to reconsider
253. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1947 Acts & Docs. 46. To the extent that
equity is seen as a part of the law of civilized nations, this statute authorizes the invocation of equity
even in instances where the parties have not agreed to a resolution ex aequo et bono. Id. at art.
38, para. 1(c).
254. Diversion of the Water From the Meuse (Neth. v. BeIg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 70,
at 76-78 (June 28).
255. See M. HuDsON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JusTIcE 1920-1942 617 (1943);
H. LAUTERPAcHT, PRIVATE LAw SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw § 28 (1927); De
Visscher, Contribution 'a L'E'tude des Cources du Droit International,60 REvuE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL Er LEGISLATION COmPAREE 325, 414 (1933).

256. Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v.
U.S.), 1982 I.CJ. 15, 59, para. 70 (Order of Feb. 24).
257. See Judge Gros's statement, id. at 143-56.
258. Teachings of scholars identified by article 38, paragraph l(d) of the statute of the I.C.J. as
a secondary means for determining the law.
259. J.BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 56 (6th ed. 1963).
260. C. DE

VISScHmR, THEORY AND REALIrY IN PUBLIc INTERNATIONAL LAw

rev. ed. 1968).
261. M. McDouoAL & F. FELIciANO, supra note 6, at 218.

157 (Corbett trans.
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the traditional belief that consent creates obligation, since the obligation may
well be inconsistent with the basic purpose of international law. As a result,
these arguments have the potential to weaken the consent rationale. If the
Court accepted the idea that "reasonableness," "order," or "socially desirable
ends" provided the litmus test for a particular decision, it would open the way
for judgments that might not give effect to the consensual obligations of the
disputants.
Any decision-making body attempting to maintain respect for the law would
still display a natural reluctance to state that consent does not serve as the basis
of obligation. Given this, arguments supportive of a position inconsistent with
consent are likely to prove successful only when the arguments are phrased in
terms that follow familiar legal justifications for departing from consensual arrangements. A direct attack on consent would be rather ill-advised. Even
though there is evidence that consent is not always the sole basis of legal
obligation, there is an inclination to reject arguments that appear too novel.
The better course of attack would be to speak in terms of the equity or fairness
of allowing a particular consensual arrangement or legal rule to be avoided in
a specific case, or the fundamental and peremptory nature of the interests
promoted by conduct at variance with a conventional understanding. Since
there is no way to determine what is equitable or fair, fundamental or peremptory, other than by considering what seems most rational or sensible, consent becomes but one factor among many other factors capable of affecting decisions.
The difference between this approach and that suggested by the proponents
of the second-tier criteria bears noting. The second-tier approach argued that
"reasonableness" ultimately determined whether intervention to protect nationals
was lawful. In attacking the consensual arrangement on force contained in the
United Nations Charter by drawing on what is equitable, fair, or fundamental,
thereby necessitating consideration of what is rational or sensible, we appear
to be following exactly the same approach. Both efforts find "reasonableness"
to be the test of the acceptability of particular conduct. Nevertheless, the distinction between the two approaches is well-defined. The second-tier criteria
approach does not question the power of consent to fix obligation; it merely
maintains that the obligation must be understood in the context of what is
reasonable. The argument that law is rooted in what is equitable, fair, or fundamental rests squarely on the position that it is not consent that is the basis
of legal obligation. Its appeal to what is reasonable is designed to clothe in
legal terminology an attack on a concept that few question. The following summary and criticism of several prominent consensual theories of obligation will
demonstrate that the basic idea of a linkage between consent and obligation is
questionable, and that any approach building on such an idea is flawed.
A. The Essence Theory
The first of the consensual theories might be described as the essence theory.
The essence theory maintains that free consent to a particular arrangement corn-
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municates an intent to bring volition in line with the terms of that arrangement.
The essence of consent is the expression of commitment. The very act of freely
giving consent restricts the alternatives available for selection. One cannot
think of consent being communicated without also thinking of consent as
obligating the one who has communicated it. Obligation may not imply consent, but consent implies obligation. In the absence of an agreement to act or
not to act in a particular fashion, the entire range of courses of action remain
open. Once consent to reduce the number of options has been voiced, this fact
circumscribes the number of courses of action from which selection can be
made. Through the relation of one's promise to another, the promisor becomes
bound to respect what he or she has said. In promising that they shall act or
refrain from acting in a particular fashion, promisors obligate themselves to
262
honor their commitments.
The essence theory focuses on the expression to do something or to not do
something; some outward manifestation of one's internal intention is the crucial
ingredient in determining whether a binding commitment is created. Hence the
name of the theory-the essence of obligation is the existence of consent itself.
From the consent alone flows the duty to act in accord with that to which one
has consented. By virtue of nothing more than the making of a promise, the
promisor is obliged to avoid departing from it.
The simplest way to demonstrate the falsity of the essence theory is to imagine a situation in which one manifests an internal intention to observe a particular proposition, and then later manifests an internal intention to no longer
continue such an observance. If obligation proceeds from consent alone, the
communication of an internal intention and nothing more, it would seem impossible to maintain that the expression of an intention to no longer observe
the earlier standard is incapable of freeing one from an earlier agreement
without casting doubt on whether the earlier agreement itself must be observed.
To deny that a later contrary intention can nullify one previously revealed is
to also deny that that at which the contrary intention is directed may bind the

262. Though I am not aware of any authority that has adopted such a puristic view, in early
Roman law, agreements were typically viewed as conventions or pacts, as distinguished from contracts. Contracts required an agreement and an obligation. Obligation was seen as a vinculum juris
("legal chain") that made an agreement binding. In most instances this was created by some special

formality. See H. MAiNE, ANCwiNT LAW 268-70 (The World's Classics ed. 1931). Further, contracts,
as distinguished from conventions, were considered as falling within one of four categories: verbal,
literal, real, or consensual. As to the first three, agreement and a formality were essential for enforcement. Id. at 270-77. But with regard to consensual contracts, those involving agency, partnership, sale, or hire, Sir Henry Sumner Maine has stated that "mutual assent of the parties, is the final
and crowning ingredient .... and ... as soon as the assent of the parties has supplied this ingredient,
there is at once a Contract." Id. at 277 (emphasis in original). The act of consent alone, therefore,
supplied the vinculumjuris or obligation for Romans with regard to at least one of the four categories
of contracts.
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speaker. 263 After all, if the essence of obligation is the external revelation of
internal intentions, then the manifestation of an intent to end an observance
should be just as significant as the manifestation designed to initiate it. Given
that few would be willing to accept the conclusion inherent in the logic of this
statement, 264 there seems legitimate reason to doubt whether the mere fact that
one's promise reveals one's innermost intentions proves that consent binds.
B. The Self-Limitation Theory
Perhaps in recognition of the essence theory's inability to explain why consent binds, the self-limitation theory was developed. 265 The self-limitation
theory focuses not on the special significance of consent, but rather on the significance of the limitation imposed by one's self on one's freedom to do as
one wishes. 266 In other words, the self-limitation theory emphasizes individual
choice that is arrived at freely, rather than that choice made through internal
processes is externally communicated.
Self-limitation theory acknowledges that externally disclosing one's internal
intentions is insufficient to create an obligation. While conceding that expressions of intention occur whenever an agreement is made, self-limitation theory
argues that consent is merely the instance of agreement or the device employed
in the agreement. Consent alone cannot create the obligation to honor one's
commitments. Obligation is linked to the free, autonomous nature of every
promisor and arises because one commits one's self to do or not to do certain
things. Everyone possesses the power of self-determination to the extent that
he or she can make conscious decisions and act on them in an effort to accomplish a result. If freedom and autonomy actually mean what they imply,
then each person who decides to agree to act in a particular way exercises his
freedom to determine his own actions and effectively limits the realm of alternatives otherwise available to him. Self-limitation theory emphasizes that

263. See J. BRIERLY, supra note 242, at 11-12.
264. See, e.g., In the Matter of an Arbitration Between the Osaka Shosen Kaisha and the Owners
of the S.S. Prometheus, 2 HONG KONG L. REv. 207, 225 (1904), reprinted in L. HENKIN, R. PUGH,
0. ScHAcHTmt & H. SMr, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATPIuALS 14 (Ist ed. 1980), in which
it is stated that:
The resistance of a nation to a law to which it has agreed does not derogate from the
authority of the law ....
Such resistance merely makes the resisting nation a breaker of
the law to which it has given its adherence... (emphasis added).
While this statement is made with regard to resistance, one need be reminded that resistance is
simply the external manifestation of a change of internal intentions.
265. This position took form in the late 19th to early 20th century under the German scholar G.
Jellineck. See G. JELLNECK, DIE R cmucHn NATUR DER STAATENVERTRAGE (1890); ALLUEmEINE
STAATSLEHRE (1900); GESETZ UND VERORDNUNG (1895). For a discussion of Jellineck's views, see
H. LAuTERPAcTrr, THE FUNCTnON OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNrT 407-15 (1966).
266. The "will" theory is related to the self-limitation theory. See generally C. FaRID, CONTRACT
As PROMISE (1981). For a review of Fried's book, see Kronman, A New Champion for the Will
Theory, 91 YALE L.J. 404 (1981).
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something beyond the act of consent, the mere formality of revealing one's intentions, is necessary in order to make the argument for viewing consent as
binding. The theory identifies the capacity to choose to restrict the options
from which future choices can be made as creating the obligation. If selfdetermination is to be understood as genuine, then self-limitation must be understood as effective.
The self-limitation theory suffers from the same deficiency as the essence
theory, although on a different level. The essence theory is unacceptable because, if the mere act of externally manifesting one's internal intentions creates
obligation, then a subsequent change of mind should also create obligation.
The self-limitation theory is subject to the same kind of attack, but on the level
of the inherent capacity of promisors to fix obligation on themselves, rather
than on the level of the act of consent, which is seen as nothing more than the
instance of agreement or the device for making the agreement. Specifically, if
the intention to limit one's will must be viewed as effective in order to give
full meaning to freedom, autonomy, or self-determination, then it would seem
that the intention-to change one's earlier expression of will must be viewed as
equally effective. In considering the conduct of one's affairs and then deciding
to behave in a manner inconsistent with an earlier decision, the liberty to select
whatever one deems appropriate is given effect by viewing the selection as
binding one to the most recent choice made. Considering this, it seems fair to
say that the location in self-determination of the reason why consent binds does
not address the problem affecting the essence theory.
. Self-limitation suffers from an additional problem by arguing that the capacity
possessed by one's self to determine one's own will explains why consent
binds, which suggests something quite antithetical to our usual understanding
of the nature of legal obligation. The very notion of legal obligation implies
something designed to constrain the will of one who is obligated, and constraint
implies an obligation from a source outside of the will of the entity being regulated. A self-imposed limitation is a limitation only as long as behavior is in
conformance with that limitation and can never rise beyond the level of mere
limitation to that of legal obligation. 267 Any limitation imposed from within
could therefore never be considered to be a legal obligation.
Another problem with the self-limitation theory is more practical in nature.
Consent supposedly binds because a promisor, capable of self-determination,
can agree to some proposition and thereby effectively limit his future choices.
But, if we are ever to know the precise extent of the obligation itself, we must
know the exact content of the promisor's agreement. 268 Since the self-limitation

267. See L BRIERLY, supra note 242, at 14.
268. D. HumE, AN INQuIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 30 n.5 (C. Hendel ed. 1957)
(1751), states: "a metaphysical schoolman might think, that where an intention was supposed to be
requisite, if that intention really had no place, no consequences ought to follow, and no obligation

be imposed."
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theory emphasizes the significance of one's capacity to decide from among the
various choices available, the only way to know whether a commitment has
indeed been violated is to know the subjective state of mind of the promisor.
The inherent difficulties of such a task are apparent. Moreover, any notion of
giving effect to subjective intention is fraught with the possibility of fraud and
prevarication. One seeking an expedient escape from the clear terms of some
onerous commitment might represent their intention at the time of agreement
as something patently inconsistent with the terms used to express the agreement
itself. Problems like this should give pause to any wholesale endorsement of
the self-limitation theory.
C. The Reliance Theory
In moving the central focus away from the mere act of consent, or the ability
to determine one's choices, the reliance theory 269 looks to a wholly external
source for evidence that consent binds. The reliance theory is that disclosures
of internal intention, resulting in a change of the positions of others based on
the expectation that future action will conform with an agreement, create an
obligation to avoid frustrating that expectation by conduct of an inconsistent
nature. The theory must do more than simply refer to the connection between
consent and reliance, however, if it is to demonstrate that reliance creates
obligation. That alone would simply beg the question of why others changing
their position in reliance on a promise compels respect for the promise. The
reliance theory presumably argues that promises which lead to reliance upon
them must be kept because ignoring them would undermine cooperative efforts
to address societal problems. If there were no assurance that such promises
would be viewed as obligatory, we would all be reduced to having to deal with
the menaces of life through our own ingenuity, cleverness, and insight.
Everyone would avoid entering into agreements that required a change in position, since the agreement would come with no guarantee that the other parties
would observe it.
The first problem with the reliance theory is its circularity. The theory holds
that consent binds because there has been reliance, and unless this is considered
to obligate, then the possibility of mutual action will be undermined. Normally
270
the theory then asks whether the reliance has been reasonable or justifiable,
for only then is the theory likely to find that the given promise or consent
obligates. Yet in asking whether the reliance has been reasonable or justifiable,
the theory again raises the question of whether this is the kind of promise that

269. See generally G. GiLMORE, THE DEaTH oF CoNmRicr 71-72 (1974).
270. This is certainly true on the municipal level. See Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 CoRNt_.L L. REv. 640, 656-659 (1982). Internationally, the Court has referred to "reliance,"
but has often stayed away from qualifications such as "reasonable." See, e.g., North Sea Continental

Shelf, 1969 I.CJ. at 26, para. 30. See also Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v.
Thailand), 1962 LCJ. 6, 63-64.
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binds. 27' To hold that consent binds simply because of reliance is not enough.
The theory itself returns us to the problem of whether this is the kind of promise
that should be enforced, a question that is not even purported to be answered
on the basis of simple reliance.
The theory is also based on an entirely erroneous premise; it considers
cooperative action to be doomed unless reliance creates obligation. Interestingly enough, many international conventions contain provisions allowing
parties to withdraw and pursue activities otherwise in violation of the convention, 272 but these provisions do not seem to have dampened willingness to make
additional agreements. Most seem to indicate that the impetus behind the
process of agreement is hope-hope that rests not so much on the belief that
reliance will result in the agreement being understood as binding, but rather
hope that rests on the reality that unless one takes a chance on a party keeping
his or her word, problems not amenable to resolution through unilateral action
will go entirely unaddressed. It would be improper to characterize such agreements as non-binding or non-legal because of their aspirational nature; the
desire to accomplish something beyond the pale of unilateral activity is, perhaps, the driving force behind the process of agreement. It not only serves to
bring parties together, but also to keep them together once agreement has been
reached. As the distinguished legal historian Sir Henry Sumner Maine related
so many years ago with regard to an ancient people known as the Troglodytes,
a people he claimed paid little attention to the obligations of contract, society
need not necessarily collapse if promises are not seen as obligatory because
other more powerful influences may nurture cooperation. 27 3 This should caution
those who insist on the reliance theory because of a preoccupation with the
need to find obligation, as well as those who believe that if promisors are free
to disregard their commitments, everyone who perceives themselves as no
longer interested in complying with some earlier agreements will simply walk
away from them. 274
The final problem with the reliance theory presents itself even if the criticism
that the theory rests on an unsound factual premise is rejected. The theory's
271. See Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 275 (1986).
272. See, e.g., Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Oct. 10, 1967, United States-United
Kingdom-U.S.S.R., 18 U.S.T. art. 16, T.I.A.S. No. 6347.
273. See H. MANE, supra note 262, at 258-59.
274. In addition to interest in the original aspiration serving to assure continued observance by
states and parties in the face of violations by others, self-interest in perpetuating an international
diplomatic environment is a better explanation of why promises are honored than the claim that
consent that creates reliance fixes obligation. In such an environment, compliance leads to cooperation which leads to effective resolution of important problems. Self-interest in such a case is
utilitarian in that it recognizes the link between the good of the community and the good of the
individual state. See D. HuME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, bk. I1, pt. II, § V (L. Selby-Bigge
ed. 1888), reprinted in G. CHRsrm, supra note 244, at 432 ("I learn to do a service to another...
because I foresee that he will return my service, in expectation of another of the same kind.").
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conclusion is that arrangements that create reliance are obligatory because they
need to be understood as such in order to maintain society. But, something
cannot become obligatory because it needs to be perceived as obligatory. The
source of legal obligation cannot be that which necessitates the rule. It may
be that it is necessary to honor consent that creates reliance if society is to be
maintained, but this need alone cannot be the source of obligation. Just as
obligation must, as was stated above,275 spring from some source beyond the
will of the promisor, so must it spring from some source other than the practical
need for the obligation. If every need resulted in the precept necessary to meet
that need acquiring binding force, then every precept directed at the accomplishment of some objective could effectively command obedience. But there is a
vast difference between acknowledging that observance of a rule is necessary
to the attainment of a particular end and calling that rule "obligatory." To say
that something is necessary in order for another thing to happen merely suggests
that it is a precondition. On the other hand, to say that something is obligatory
implies at least a duty on the part of one able to determine whether the precon276
dition occurs to undertake efforts to assure its occurrence.
D. The Common Will Theory
The common will theory is an effort to break through the self-limitation
theory's restrictions and identify, in a source beyond individual will, something
that brings obligation to consent. This theory suggests that the capacity of
every promisor to determine how to conduct his affairs can be effectively
limited by joining with others in a fusion of individual wills. The consequence
of this conjunction of wills is the creation of a "super-will" that is more than
the reflection of each of the individual wills involved. As a super-will, it stands
apart from each of the individual wills. And by its very nature as separate
from and in addition to each of the individual wills comprising it, the super-will
establishes a standard from which any one will is incompetent to depart. The
standard is framed by the contours of consent evidenced in the expressions of
will by all agreeing to a particular commitment. Its capacity to bind flows
from the product of the common will, the amalgam of individual wills which,
by its very nature, embodies the strength of each of the wills partaking in the
277
act leading to its conception.
The common will theory overcomes the self-limitation theory's problem of
failing to explain why consent binds by locating an explanation outside the very
thing consent claims to regulate. Nonetheless, the idea of pointing to the
product of the fusion of individual wills as the source of obligation for consent

275. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
276. See infra text accompanying notes 278-97 (§IV E, "Metaphysical Theory").
277. See TRmPEL, VoLKauzEc Ht
IN EsRtcHr (1899). Triepel restates his super-will theory
in Triepel, Rapports Entre le DroitInterne et le Droit International,1 REcuEtL DES CouRs 77 (1923).
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is flawed. The central weakness in the common will theory is its failure to
explain how the conjunction of several individual wills gives rise to a "superwill" able to command obedience. The capacity of promisors to determine for
themselves how they will conduct their affairs can be seen as leading to agreements designed to limit what is permissible. But it is unclear how such an
agreement creates a will which is independent, separate, and superior to any of
the individual wills it reflects, or how the common will captured by an agreement is anything more than a collective expression of a uniform desire.
The sharing of a uniform desire by several promisors followed by an agreement directed at narrowing the permissible alternatives of choice does not suggest that the agreement is anything more than a collaborative statement
indicating a single view with regard to some specific problem. This view may
be described as the common will, but there is nothing about the fact that the
commonality emerged from a shared desire which necessarily invests it with
the power to command observance. The transition from individual desire to
common agreement can be made without compelling the conclusion that the
agreement represents a will superior to any of the discrete wills that the agreement implements. The common will does comprise the sum of all of the individual wills consenting to a particular proposition at any point in time, but
it gains no power beyond that of any one of the individual wills involved. The
process of joining one will with another increases the size of the notion that a
problem be resolved in a certain fashion, but in no way increases the force of
the will that it be so resolved. It is the capacity of self-determination that
stands for individual will, and there would be no self-determination left if, after
joining with others, one did anything more than vest the common will with a
power beyond what the individual will wished at the time of the union.
Even if the common will theory is assumed to explain how several individual
wills can become a super-will able to command observance, a second weakness
exists because the theory does not explain why such a super-will must be observed. The mere fact that several individual wills can be fused into a separate,
independent, superior will does not explain why the superior will is to be
obeyed. To say that it is through the process of conjoining of individual wills
that the super-will is given life indicates how the super-will comes to be, but
it fails to explain how the super-will creates an obligation. Actions inconsistent
with the super-will may bring immediate and harsh penalties. Nevertheless, to
speak of something as obligatory means that it "should" be observed; it does
not simply imply that the failure to do so will result in penalties. Thus a will
may be superior in the sense of wielding the power to punish, and yet lack
superiority in the important sense of possessing a claim, on a normative level,
of expecting obedience.
E. The Metaphysical Theory
There are extensions of the preceding theories that raise the importance of
explaining consent as obligatory because of an all-powerful authority immanent
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in the universe. The self-limitation theory, for instance, might be extended to
argue that "one is obligated to keep one's word because it is the only just and
fair thing to do." The reliance theory might be extended to argue that "allow-

ing one to disregard promises which result in others changing their position
would be immoral." The common will theory might be extended to account

for the missing normative element by holding that "expressions of consent incident to agreement involving similar expressions on the part of others must be
honored because that is right and proper." These extensions locate the basis

for holding a promisor obligated based on his consent in some timeless, unchanging, transcendent authority.

This metaphysical theory is of ancient pedigree.2 78 In its classical form, it
maintained that there was a grand plan or systematic order to the universe which
was discoverable by mankind through the use of the senses or the power of
rational reflection. 279 Further, since the plan is the product of an uncreated

creator, it must be viewed as obligatory, for not only does all that has been or
will ever be owe its very existence to the creator, but a force that precedes
both time and creation is by its nature alone entitled to obedience.

280

The

modem form of the theory refrains from a reliance on an uncreated creator or
on plans evident in creation and speaks instead of practical reasonableness, 2 '
the original position, 2 2 or just entitlements. 283 All of these concepts are simply
subspecies of the classical form of the theory. In the end, their own compulsion

depends on whether they are concepts enjoined on us, which depends on
whether that which enjoins them, regardless of it being termed an uncreated

278. The tradition of explaining obligation by reference to a metaphysical power dates back to
the Greek Stoics. See generally R. ADAMSON, THE DEVLOPmNT OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY 79-83, 25794 (1908). The essence of their thinking was expressed by Chrysippus who believed divine
providence animates the world, that animation is expressed through nature, nature is rational, that
man is unique in that man has reason, and that the good life consists in living in accordance with
nature and resigning one's self to the purposes of the divine being. See generally J. GOULD, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF CHRYSIPPUS (1970).
The Roman Stoic, Cicero, had similar views. He maintained that man was born for justice, that
justice comes from natural law, that natural law is the sense of right that is common to man and
God, and that the sense of right is derived from Nature. See CICERO, ON THE LAWS: BOOK ONE,
in SELECTED WORKS OF CICERO 218, 228-33 (H. Hubbell trans. Classics Club ed. 1948).
279. See T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Pt. 1, 2d pt., ques. 91, art. 2, at 996-97, ans; ques.
94, art. 1, ans. & reply 2, at 1008 (1947); CICERO, LAws, bk. III § 19 (C. Keyes trans. Loeb Classical
Library ed. 1928); H. GROrIUS, DE JURE BLu AC PACIS (F. Kelsey trans. The Classics of Intemational Law ed. 1925); F. De Vitoria, De Potestate Civili (1528), translated in J. ScoT, Tim SPANISH
OIGIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, Part 1, Francisco de Vitoria and his Law of Nations, app. C (1934);
F. SUAREZ, DE LEGIBUS AC DEO LEGISLATORE (G. Williams, A. Brown & J. Waldron trans., The
Classics of International Law ed. 1964) (1612).
280. See 2 S. PuFENDORF, DE JuRAE NATIJRAE ET GENTIUM, ch. III, § 20 (C. H. & W. A.
Oldfather trans. The Classics of International Law ed. 1934) (1627).
281. See J. FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 100-128 (1980).
282. See generally J. RAwLs, THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
283. See R NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 149-64 (1974).
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creator, an inexorable immanent force, or something else, is itself something to
2 4
be obeyed.
Considering both the classical and modem forms of the metaphysical theory
together, the former openly relying on some transcendent, omnipresent force,
and the latter doing so only implicitly, there still remains the question of how

the theory translates consent or promise into obligation. It might be argued
that the very existence of a universal order or plan suggests a commitment to

integrity, fidelity, and honesty. Without these goals the plan could never
flourish and unfold, and the inherent rhythm or workings of life and all exis-

tence could never develop and mature. As a consequence, integrity, fidelity,
and honesty are obligatory standards in accordance with which the most mun-

dane aspects of daily existence must be conducted. Therefore, a promisor has
an obligation to keep his promises. The failure to respect one's commitments

not only triggers the possibility of sanctions, but also results in the violation
of a normative standard enjoined upon us all.

The metaphysical theory's explanation of why consent binds, however, seems
as unsatisfactory as that of any of the other theories already offered. Even if
one accepts both the existence of some supreme, immanent force and the neces286
28 5
sity for obeying the supreme force's will, points certainly open to debate,
284. An excellent illustration of this awareness is found in Barnett, supra note 271, at 296-97.
In the context of using entitlement analysis to explain the consensual basis of contract law, Barnett
refers to the underlying moral approach of the entitlement theory. See also id. at 293 (referring to
"shared intuitions"). See also J. FINIs, supra note 281, at 406-07. With regard to practical
reasonableness, Finnis admits that ultimately "God is the basis of obligation," but he uses "obligation" in a much weaker sense than that in which it is usually used.
285. With respect to why the supreme, immanent force should be obeyed, see supra note 280
and accompanying text and infra note 286. With regard to the existence of such a force, it might
be reasoned that everything in the universe must have come into being as a consequence of something being able to create the original matter from which all that has ever been can be said to have
descended. Things that we see today are the result of mechanisms of creation that existed prior to
today's things doming into being. Long before the mechanisms of today's creation came into being,
there existed still more antecedent and earlier mechanisms, going back to the first of all creative
mechanisms. Yet the very first creative mechanism was itself created out of matter, and that matter,
because there existed no earlier creative mechanism in the universe to create it, had to have been
created by something. Whatever created the matter from which the first creative mechanism was
created had to have been either itself the uncreated creator, or created by something that was, or
could trace its lineage back to, the uncreated creator. See generally G. GRiSEz, BEYOND THE NEW
THEISM: A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION (1975) (on the existence of an uncreated creator).
286. The fact that the supreme, immanent force is able to bring things into being does not mean
that its will is to be obeyed. There are numerous things that are able to bring new and independent
things into being. The mere fact that this power is possessed does not mean that there is some
obligation on the part of that which is given existence to follow what its creator desires. Obligation
suggests a need, in a normative rather than a practical or emotional sense, to follow some particular
course of behavior. An awareness that existence itself is owed to a creative force may evoke in
that which is created a feeling of or a sense of commitment, a feeling or sense born out of loving
gratitude for conception, to act in accord with the will of the creator. Standing alone, the bare fact
of creation does not suggest an obligation to the wishes of the creative force. The simplest illustration is that a child would not be obligated to follow the will of its parents, were that will directed
at securing odious, heinous acts. The relationship between obligation and morality is evident, and
the relative meaninglessness of the fact of creation is apparent. Nevertheless, it is still conceivable
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whether mankind can ever really know the will of that force
It might be suggested that its will is known by observing the
A transcendent power responsible for every aspect of creation
in a position to choose from among an infinite variety of creaof which would have differed in its final product. Since choice

itself suggests some deliberation with regard to what is ultimately chosen, and
deliberation connotes the existence of some desired objective or goal, the creative plan ultimately selected by that transcendent power revealed the will of
that power. 289
Perhaps this suggestion is entirely correct and what is seen about us does
reveal the true objective or goal of some omnipotent primal force. Yet it seems

that the will of the supreme, immanent force, the uncreated creator, is to be obeyed. But if so, the
explanation must lie not in the fact that the force created all things, but rather in the ethical pull
of its will. Such an obligation might be found in the desire to follow the will of such a force
simply out of a commitment to friendship with it. J. FRNNIs, supra note 281, at 406-07. In the
event that the latter explanation is accepted, "obligation" must be understood to mean something
different from what it is usually taken to mean. See supra note 284.
On the matter of the existence of a supreme, immanent force, it might be suggested that the argument of an uncreated creator demonstrates nothing more than that an uncreated creator exists. If
we label the force or creator "God," discussion about God's existence is not just carried on for its
own benefit. Rather, its objective is to lay the foundation for the exploration of other questions,
particularly whether the will of the supreme force is to be obeyed. When examining the question
of whether the will of one is to be obeyed, the attribution of the will to a being labelled "God"
certainly has the effect of creating a predisposition toward perceiving that will as binding. Merely
using the term "God" carries connotations that might otherwise require independent demonstration.
If something is said to proceed from God, then it is virtually taken as a given that it has a force
which it would not be assumed to possess were it to have come from a source given a different
appellation. Thus, while the argument regarding the existence of an uncreated creator, something
that has caused to come into being all that has been or ever will be, may be an argument that is
viewed as basically sound and persuasive, there is nothing about the argument to suggest that it
establishes the existence of God, that is, the existence of One whose will is necessarily regarded as
obligatory. The argument does demonstrate that, but for the existence of an uncreated creator nothing else would exist. If one is content to leave all assertions concerning an uncreated creator at
that point, then the term "God" would be an acceptable substitute for a supreme, immanent, and
timeless force or power. God would be synonymous with the uncreated creator or the supreme,
immanent power. Cf J. FIrNNs, supra note 281, at 388-89 (indicating a similar reluctance to fix an
"uncaused cause" with the label "God").
287. Even St. Thomas Aquinas noted that "the will of God cannot be investigated by reason,
except as regards those things which God must will of necessity; and what He wills about creatures
is not among these, as was said above." T. AQUINAS, supra note 279, Pt. 1, ques. 46, art. 2, at 243
(emphasis added).
288. See CicERo, supra note 278, at 225-27 (suggesting that the metaphysical theory is linked
to sensory perception and careful reflection). Several variations of the metaphysical theory have
existed. Cicero proposed that humans draw rational inferences from what is known about humankind
and the environment, and that justice is to be sought in what is natural to man. Id. See also S.
Clarke, A Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion, reprinted in
BRrrTISH MORALISTS: 1650-1800 para. 244 (D. Raphael ed. 1969) (1706) (the duties of natural law
"may... be deduced from the nature of man .... "). Another variation holds that humans must
focus their reflection inward in order to obtain an awareness and deeper understanding of what they
already know. See T. AQUINAS, supra note 279, Pt. 1, 2d pt., ques. 94, art. 2, ans., at 1009.
289. Cf J. FINNis, supra note 281, at 389.
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that, in moving from what we observe in nature to the conclusion that nature
evidences the will of such a force, we overlook the possibility that choice or
selection of a creative plan does not necessarily mean there has been deliberation. In the event there has been a conscious rejection of all but the adopted
plan, or at the minimum a conscious choice from alternatives considered less
attractive, deliberation may indeed reveal one's will. But we can never be sure
that such a process has been utilized.290 The suggestion that the choice of a
creative plan discloses the will of some universal, transcendent power assumes
that the power's choice has been deliberate. It may well be that in choosing
the plan which resulted in what we perceive to be nature, the power simply
acted for its own delight and did not attempt to display a normative structure
that man was intended to follow. 29' Alternatively, it may be that the choice of
plans was no more the product of deliberation and considered reflection than
any course pursued when one chooses merely in order to get the job of choice
out of the way. Indeed, in light of the many examples of disorder in nature
(e.g., natural disasters, defective offspring), it would not seem strange for one
to subscribe to the position that nature reveals nothing more than that the inherent limitations of physical forces can, over a long period of time, bring about
enough evolutionary advances to produce some modicum of order from chaos.
Beyond the matter of knowing the will of an immanent, all-powerful force,
there is a second and perhaps even more important problem that undercuts any
theory that draws on metaphysical explanations. The theory holds that all of
existence reveals some inexorable force's will and that these manifestations of
will contain, at their core and awaiting discovery, the essential aspects of an
inherent normative structure. Since such a force's will is understood as being
obligatory, the normative structure revealed in nature is seen as commanding
obedience, and what prevails in nature reflects a "natural law" binding on all
of mankind. Yet the mere existence of certain natural facts in mankind or in
292
the environment does not, without more, create an obligation.
The problem of inferring obligation from natural facts is similar to that concerning whether a supreme and limitless power's will is something to be
obeyed. If one accepts that the will of such a power is revealed in creation,
then asking whether that will is to be obeyed is like asking whether the facts
of creation fix an obligation. Yet it is quite possible to accept that the supreme
power's will is to be obeyed, and still ask whether the facts resulting from that

290. See supra note 287 (Aquinas's skepticism).
291. To be sure, creation has been described as a play or drama in both the Western and Eastern
philosophical traditions. See PLATO, THE LAws OF PLATO: BOOKS VII-XII 803b-c (1921) (man as
God's plaything); F. CAPRA, THE TAO OF PHYsics 78 (2d ed. 1982) (Hinduism and creation seen as
a play).
292. See D. HUME, A TRSArSE OF HuMAN NATURE, bk. III, Pt. 1, § 1 (L. Selby-Bigge ed. 1888)
(one cannot conclude that what "is" indicates what one "ought" to do). See also H. KELSEN, WHAT
Is JusTicE? 137, 144, 174-97 (1957); Nielsen, The Myth of Natural Law, in LAw AND PHILOSOPHY
122, 132 (S. Hook ed. 1964).
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power's creative plan establish obligation. The facts of nature may exist as a
result of a manifestation of will of an immanent and timeless force, and with
regard to those facts it might be that the selection of a creative plan could not
have been disobeyed. Once the facts demonstrating that force's will were
brought into being, and the force's selected plan had come to fruition, the final
result remains nothing more than a mere set of facts. The facts may be that
humans were endowed with reason, that every living creature was given the
instinct for survival, or any number of things. Nonetheless, they are still nothing but facts. They may be binding in a physical sense, in that they must be
observed in the sense of natural occurrence, because it can be no other way.
This is distinct from having force in a normative sense. In selecting from
among the infinite variety of creative plans available, a transcendent power
presumably evidenced its will that the existing facts were preferable over some
other alternative. Since that power's will is to be obeyed, there may have been
no alternative but for those facts to have come into being. Once in being, those
facts may have to be followed in the physical sense; yet that alone cannot make
them binding in the normative sense. Normative obligation implies that a thing
"ought" to be done, while physical obligation implies simply that it exists or
293
will come into existence.
Contending that a normative structure is deeply imprinted on the mind of all
human beings does not avoid these difficulties. 294 This contention does obviate
the need to deduce the "natural law" from observable aspects of man's nature
and his environment. 295 The claim that a natural normative system is simply
a part of humanity's intellectual "hardwiring" avoids the need to move from
facts of nature to specific normative principles. Nevertheless, as with approaches to "natural law" theories that suggest that the essential aspects of that
law are found in nature and await discovery through careful, painstaking, and
reasonable reflection, the notion that natural law is already within humans, although we do not fully appreciate it, leads to the same problems. Even accepting the idea that, in the deep recesses of the human mind, right and wrong
are known from the first moment of cognitive recognition, a point which seems
of dubious validity in view of evidence indicating that what we might think of
as intuitive knowledge is sometimes totally inaccurate, 296 there is still the problem of whether some transcendent power, in placing intuitive knowledge in
humankind, actually manifested its will. Even if the matter of the manifestation
of will is taken as a given, there remains the additional problem of whether a

293.
294.
ans., at
295.

H. KELSEN, supra note 292, at 139.
On the "imprint" theory, see T. AQUINAS, supra note 279, at Pt. 1, 2d pt., ques. 94, art. 2,
1009.
Cf. D. O'CoNNoR, AQUINAS AND NAT'uRAL LAW 68 (1967).

296. See R. RESTAK, THE MmI 238 (1988) (intuitively people feel, though quite incorrectly, that
more words have consonants as their first letter than as their third letter).
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transcendent power's will that humans be endowed with innate knowledge of
a normative structure can, as a mere fact of nature, give rise to obligation. 297
F. The Intellectual Construct Theory
The final theory that might be used to explain consent as the basis of obligation is the intellectual construct theory. As with the metaphysical theory and
the common will theory, the idea is to identify what makes promises binding
by looking to sources beyond the will of the promisor. The intellectual construct theory does this through the creation of a hierarchy of rules. The suggestion is that at the everyday level, rules of one sort establish the parameters
designed to directly regulate the interrelationships of life. These rules might
be termed first-order rules. At another level, rules of an entirely different sort
exist to determine whether the first-order rules are valid. These rules might
298
be called second-order rules.
Among the second-order rules might be a rule providing that everyone should
behave as others have customarily behaved. 299 And since promises are usually,
though not always, observed, a first-order rule considering consensual undertakings to be obligatory would be deemed valid and enforceable. Consequently,
in order to determine the ultimate explanation or basis for the idea that consent
binds, one would need to look behind the first-order rule to the second-order
rule that gives the first its force. In other words, the intellectual construct
theory would explain consent as the basis of obligation by virtue of reference
to a second-order master rule which maintains that behavior ought to proceed
as it has customarily proceeded, that is, in accordance with the keeping of
promises. The theory avoids the problems created by other theories that look
no further than the consenting individual since it seeks to identify the basis of
consent in an outside source. Nevertheless, the use of a second-order master
rule to explain the obligatory nature of consent has problems of its own.

297. The arguments made above on knowing and obeying God's will do not affect one's commitment to religious principles, at least to the extent that commitment is based on loving God out
of friendship. See J. FniNs, supra note 281, at 403-10. Indeed, if one views the Old Testament
as emphasizing a powerful, intimidating, and wrathful God, and the New Testament as emphasizing
a loving, forgiving, and gentle God, it makes sense to follow religious principles out of friendship
and respect rather than out of obligation and imposition.
298. On advancing similar hierarchical rule systems, see D. ANZlLoTI, CORSO DI Dauro INTERNAZIONALE 43 (3d ed. 1928) ("a complex of norms which derive their obligatory character from a
fundamental norm"); H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 78-98 (1961); H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY
OF LAw AND STATE (A. Wedberg trans. 1945), reprinted in G. CQusuE, supra note 244, at 621-23;

J. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 137 (11th ed. 1957) ("ultimate legal principles").
299. Kelsen certainly suggests this in the international realm. See H. KELSEN, PuRE THEORY OF
LAw 215-17 (Knight trans. 1967). A similar approach is taken by Kelsen with regard to the
municipal or domestic realm. See H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE, supra note
298, at 625 ("one ought to behave as the individual, or the individuals, who laid down the first
constitution have ordained").
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The intellectual construct theory presupposes the existence of second-order
master rules such as the one approving behavior consistent with the customary
behavior of others.3°° In doing so, the theory fails to demonstrate the existence
of such rules. Given that the entire hierarchical system that the theory erects
hinges on the second-order rules, this matter should not be left aside and
unsubstantiated.
The intellectual construct theory must demonstrate two vital facts. First, the
theory must address the actual existence of observable forms of repetitive,
widespread, customary behavior within the given community. In the absence
of the recurring practice upon which second-order rules are based, presuppositions regarding the occurrence of such practices are subject to the criticism of
being mere figments of the imagination. 30 1 Also, the customary practice must
take on a normative quality. To suggest that a second-order rule maintaining
that one "ought" to behave as others have traditionally behaved implies that
there is something about traditional or customary behavior that appeals to the
conscience. Unless the link between custom and normativity is established,
second-order rules would only indicate that behavior of a customary nature
exists.
The second problem with the intellectual construct theory is also a derivative
of the hypothetical nature of second-order rules. Even if both the existence
and the normative character of customary behavior are conceded, the theory
says nothing about the obligational validity of second-order rules. The intellectual construct theory does not address why the pull of custom that appeals
to the conscience is obligatory in the sense that it is to be accepted and not
resisted. 30 2 It may be that the kind of repetitive behavior that gives rise to
custom can be shown to exist. It may also be that custom takes on a normative
quality that tugs at one's sense of rightness. Nevertheless, the intellectual construct theory says nothing about why the tension resulting from that tug must
be accepted and not opposed.
Given that the primary proponents of the intellectual construct theory belong
to the jurisprudential school of positivism, it is not surprising to find an absence
of discussion about the obligational validity of second-order rules. 30 3 Obliga300. See H.

KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW,

supra note 299, at 215-17 ("a basic norm [that

individuals ought to behave as others have customarily behaved] is presupposed"). See also H. KELsEN, WHAT Is JusncE?, supra note 292, at 262 (in speaking of domestic law he states, "The basic
norm that we ought to obey the provisions of the historically first constitution is not created by...
legal authority ... ; it is a norm which ... we presuppose as a hypothesis.").
301. There would probably be little difficulty in showing the existence of repetitive, customary
behavior.
302. This problem of obligational validity, as distinct from the validity of the existence of secondorder rules, was noted by Hart as a criticism of Kelsen. See H. HART, supra note 298, at 105, 245.
303. Positivists have long insisted on the separation of law and morality. To the extent that the
question of why second-order rules bind requires one to consider the connection between the law

and morality, positivists view this as beyond the scope of jurisprudence. See generally Austin, The
Province of JurisprudenceDetermined, in I LEcruREs ON JuRisPRuENcF (R. Campbell 5th ed. 1885).
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tional validity can be observed in the context of the first-order rules that regulate everyday life. In that setting, obligational validity is demonstrated by firstorder rules being recognized as consistent with the empowering second-order
rules.3°4 In other words, to think of first-order rules as possessing validity that
gives them force merely requires thinking of them as measuring up to the requirements of second-order rules. But obligational validity is never to be considered in the context of second-order rules, which are presumed to have
obligational validity. To ask why the pull that they exert on the conscience is
to be understood as obligatory is to ask a question that the positivist considers
outside of the proper realm of jurisprudential inquiry.
The analytical purity of positivism is intellectually sufficient for some purposes, but is quite dissatisfying for one who wants to know what it is about
consent that makes it binding. The formulation of a theory containing firstand second-order rules may allow one to determine which rules suggested as
valid first-order rules indeed are valid. But since the theory does not profess
to explain why the second-order rules used to judge first-order rules possess
the power to obligate, the theory does not go far enough. 30 5 The intellectual
construct theory does take us beyond the limitations of theories explaining consent as binding by reference to the will of a promisor. Yet in failing to go
beyond the hypothesized nature of second-order rules, the theory is no less deficient than any of the other theories that have been offered to show how consent
binds.
V. CONCLUSION

To many, the suggestion that consent is incapable of serving as the basis of
legal obligation may seem novel and inconsistent with deeply felt intuition. On
the contrary, the suggestion is not only far from new, but has been powerfully
offered in one form or another by scholars whose thoughtfulness, balance,
perspective, and stature are truly impressive. Included in this collection would
be such prominent internationalists as James Brierly, 3° 6 Sir Humphrey Waldock,307 and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice. 0° To find that consent is not the basis of
obligation does not necessarily mean that every rule consensually agreed to
lacks the force to obligate. As stated earlier,3 9 some other basis of obligation
may give force to all or some standards arrived at consensually. The best way
304. This is the thrust of Hart's "rule of recognition." See H. HART, supra note 298, at 89-93.
On ascertaining the nature of the "rule of recognition" in the United States, see Greenawalt, The
Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REv. 621 (1987).
305. See P. SoPER, supra note 35, at 27-28.
306. See J. BRIERLY, supra note 242, at 9-18.
307. See Waldock, General Course on PublicInternationalLaw, 2 RECUEIL Dts CouRs 1, 52-53
(1962) (observing, in the context of new states being bound by existing customary international law,
that something more than consent is involved).
308. See Fitzmaurice, The Foundations of the Authority of InternationalLaw and the Problem
of Enforcement, 19 MOD. L. REv. 1, 9 (1956) ("[consent] cannot per se be the reason").
309. See supra notes 243-47 and accompanying text.
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to persuade decision-makers to turn to such a basis is by stressing that decisions
founded on consent must prove to be equitable, fair, and reasonable. In moving
in that direction and recognizing that consent cannot explain why one is bound
to do as one has promised, we may position ourselves to evaluate each situation
on the basis of every relevant consideration, keeping in the forefront of our
minds the idea that all law grew out of a need to regulate societal affairs in a
fashion that promoted the order necessary to allow the greatest possible
development of mankind. Requiring that commitments be honored is an element, but only one element, in the promotion of that order. As Professor
Michael Reisman so aptly put it: "Though ... decision may diverge from
the purport of. . .international law . . ., the test of the decision's lawfulness

is not its conformity to these secondary [i.e., legal] expressions of international
policy, but its consonance with the fundamental goals of the international community." 310 If we ignore the problems associated with the claim that consent
is the basis of obligation and insist on following the letter of consensual undertakings, we turn our backs on the goal that led to the creation of law in the
first instance and deprive each member of society of the opportunity to experience the kind of development that leads to a sense of satisfaction that the
complete measure of life has been attained.
As regards the use of force to protect nationals abroad, the notion that consent
cannot serve as the basis of obligation means that states are not invariably required to refrain from using military measures to defend nationals located in
foreign countries. Once consent is rejected as the basis of obligation, the indication in the Charter that states agreed to a regime outlawing the use of force
for the protection of nationals abroad is cast in a new and different light.
Though some other explanation may be advanced for why the Charter regime
is to be followed, by moving away from an explanation founded on consent,
we open up the possibility of being able to benefit from an approach that
revives the original connection of the law with societal development. Examined
in factual context, some instances involving force to protect nationals may be
deemed consistent with that goal while others may be found wanting. The only
point made here is that in liberating ourselves from the power imputed to consent, an entirely new perspective is gained for the analysis of legal problems
affecting international affairs.
Admittedly, this new perspective is one rife with the possibility of increased
uses of force. That genuinely troubling concern should not be casually shunted
aside. With the rules of law seen as not necessarily obligatory just because
they have been consented to, and, with subjective judgment given more
flexibility, the chances for abuse rapidly multiply. Nonetheless, the new
perspective has the advantage of confronting all of us with the stark and unal-

310. M. REISMAN, NuLLrrY AND REviSION 562 (1971) (statement made in regard to tribunals using
equitable principles to produce results inconsistent with the law when they are not authorized to
decide ex aequo et bono).
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terable reality that we, and not the law, serve as the true architects of our ultimate destiny. History is replete with instances of concerted efforts at regulation followed by cataclysmic violence or widespread lawlessness. 31' In the final
analysis, the future of mankind hinges not on the development of a sophisticated
system of legal rules to govern societal relationships, but on whether each individual has the courage and determination to labor unremittingly at husbanding
the compassion and judgment of others. Legal rules, no matter how finely
crafted, can never deter the use of force or antisocial behavior as effectively
as can a committed effort to inculcate in every individual a sense of the real
value of human life and a full respect for the dignity of every person.
It may also be true that, by deprecating consent and inviting efforts to locate
the source of obligation elsewhere, one runs the risk of being left with the conclusion that there is nothing at all about law that makes it inherently obligatory.
Does this mean that there are no alternatives to social cacophony? If there is
merit to the earlier observation that we must look beyond legal rules to
effectively resolve the problems society faces, then an orientation that
downplays the tradition of reliance on law is the mark of true wisdom. Responsible judgment and heartfelt compassion should be raised to the privileged position that has been reserved too often for faith in the law's ability to improve
the human condition. Couple this elevation with a recognition by decisionmakers of the inability of the law to truly fix obligation, and it is just possible
that the world could be better off. Surely through a widespread and genuine
effort to nurture responsibility and compassion, the general level of civil behavior would be improved. And if those who evaluate actions that have been
taken, or are about to be taken, recognize the somewhat limited force that legal
rules really have, then law can be restored to its proper role as the handmaiden,
rather than the master, of humankind. In the final analysis, both specific rules
of law and personal promises may be deemed as entitled to respect. But if
that is to be the case, it will come as a result of that decision being rationally
considered more appropriate in an ordered society, not because of a blind devotion to rules and promises for the sake of devotion itself.
Finally, there should be no mistake about the position regarding the use of
force implicit in the foregoing analysis. The view that consent does not necessarily bind, indeed that law itself may not possess the power essential to establish obligation, holds out the probability that some instances involving the
use of force to protect nationals abroad could be judged differently than under
traditional technical analysis. Despite this, one who decides, in the face of the
solemn consensual standard contained in article 51 of the United Nations
Charter, that the use of force is indeed appropriate should first brood long and
searchingly over John Milton's eloquent admonition that "force overcomes but

311. Recall, for example, that the Second World War followed on the heels of numerous international arrangements designed to control military power. On the national level, the Prohibition Era
involved much regulation that had little effect in controlling the consumption of alcoholic beverages.
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half one's foe. '312 For what has been suggested in these pages is by no means
an apology for those who may cavalierly resort to military measures to resolve
international tensions. Quite to the contrary, it is but a call, by one who deeply
detests violence, for an honest examination of the nature of law and the best
way to ameliorate the human condition.

312. J. MILTON, PARADISE LOST 110 (M. Kelley ed. 1943).

